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HOW WILL WE REGULATE GENETIC 
ENHANCEMENT? 
Maxwell J. Mehlman* 
Genetic enhancement technologies present difficult and novel 
regulatory issues, including the problem of measuring and 
comparing risks and benefits and dealing with the impact of 
these technologies on social values. This Article describes and 
evaluates the potential approaches that may be taken to regu-
late these technologies. The author concludes that a variety of 
approaches will be necessary, involving self-regulation, gov-
ernment restrictions on access and use, licensing, and a na-
tional lottery. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 1997, the National Institutes of Health 
("NIH") convened the first of its "Gene Therapy Policy Conferences." 
The subject was the regulation of genetic enhancement. This meet-
ing marked a new attitude toward the subject; previously, genetic 
enhancement was regarded largely as science fiction, and serious 
discussion of its attendant ethical, legal, and social issues was con-
spicuously absent from serious genetics journals.1 The meeting was 
prompted by a request to NIH to approve a protocol for conducting a 
* B.A. Reed College; B.A. Oxford University; J.D. Yale Law School. The 
author is Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine 
Center, Case Western Reserve University, and Professor of Biomedical Ethics, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine. This article was written 
under a grant from the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Research Pro-
gram, Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health (No. 1 
R01 HG01446-01A1). The author thanks Tom Murray and Eric Juengst for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts; John Starn, Michael Cosgrove, Jenni-
fer Walker, and Catherine Hess for their research help; and the participants in 
the NIH Gene Therapy Policy Conference, September 11, 1997. 
1. No doubt the legitimization of the topic of genetic enhancement was 
aided by the successful cloning of "Dolly" in Scotland, an accomplishment previ-
ously dismissed as science fiction. See Gina Kolata, Little-Known Panel Chal-
lenged to Make Quick Cloning Study, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at C1 ("Dr. 
Wilmut's feat shocked the world, for even most scientists had assumed that the 
cloning of adults was biologically impossible and was merely the stuff of science 
fiction."). 
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gene therapy experiment on healthy volunteers, rather than on pa-
tients.2 Although the experiment was part of an effort to develop 
treatments for cystic fibrosis, the proposed use of healthy subjects 
raised, for the first time, the question of whether and in what cir-
cumstances it was appropriate to use gene insertion technology in 
"normal" individuals. 3 Officials at NIH realized that it was a short 
step from preliminary testing in healthy subjects of a genetic treat-
ment for disease to experiments intended to genetically enhance a 
normal person's physical or mental characteristics.4 
In a sense, genetic enhancement has been with us for some time 
if we include within that category genetically engineered drug prod-
ucts used to alter physical traits. Human growth hormone ("HGH"), 
which had been obtainable prior to 1985 only in limited quantities 
from cadaveric pituitary glands, 5 now can be produced in a virtually 
inexhaustible supply using recombinant DNA technology.6 When its 
supply was more limited, HGH was prescribed for children with 
short stature caused by classical growth hormone deficiency.7 With 
the advent of recombinant DNA manufacturing, however, some phy-
sicians have begun recommending use of HGH for non-hormone-
deficient children who are below "normal" height. 8 A survey of pedi-
atric endocrinologists, for example, found that as many as thirty-
three percent of the respondents would recommend HGH for chil-
dren who were not hormone-deficient, but who were in the lowest 
three percent of their age group in terms of height. 9 Endocrinolo-
gists also report being asked by parents of "normal" children to pre-
scribe HGH in order to give their children an advantage in competi-
2. See Rick Weiss, Gene Enhancements' Thorny Ethical Traits, WASH. 
PosT, Oct. 12, 1997, at A1 (describing a meeting between the NIH and the Food 
and Drug Administration (''FDA") that considered regulation of cosmetic gene 
therapy). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See Mark McDonald, A Growth Industry: Some Athletes Are Turning to 
Hormone for Competitive Edge, but Safety Debated, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
May 21, 1995, at lA. 
6. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Considerations Related to the Use 
of Recombinant Human Growth Hormone in Children, 99 PEDIATRICS 122 
(1997). 
7. See id. 
8. See id.; see also Leona Cuttler et al., Short Stature and Growth Hor-
mone Therapy: A National Study of Physician Recommendation Patterns, 276 
JAMA 531, 531 (1996) (indicating many pediatric endocrinologists consider 
growth hormone treatment appropriate for non-growth hormone deficient chil-
dren). 
9. See Cuttler et al., supra note 8, at 533 fig.l. Children in the survey 
were two standard deviations from the mean height for their age. See id. Ap-
proximately 90,000 of the three million children bom each year will fall into 
this category. See Barry Werth, How Short Is Too Short?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
1991, § 6, at 14. 
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tive sports.10 Adult athletes are believed to use HGH to spur bone 
and muscle growth.n 
Although the use of recombinant drugs such as HGH raises im-
portant regulatory issues, as we shall see, the NIH conference was 
inspired by the prospect of genetic enhancement achieved by more 
radical technologies-in particular, gene insertion. This involves 
the introduction of actual genetic material into a person's cells. 
When the goal is therapeutic, the genetic material may consist of a 
"normal" gene that compensates for a missing or defective gene.12 
When the goal is enhancement, the gene may supplement the fimc-
tioning of normal genes or supersede them with "supergenes" that 
have been engineered to produce a desired enhancement effect.13 
Gene insertion may be intended to affect a single individual, or it 
may target a person's reproductive cells, in which case the resulting 
effect, if complemented by the cells of the person's reproductive 
partner, will be produced in their children and passed on to suc-
ceeding generations.14 
Genetic enhancement raises a host of ethical, legal, and social 
questions. When should parents give drugs such as HGH to chil-
dren of "normal" stature? For that matter, what is meant by "nor-
mal"-i.e., when is a genetic intervention "enhancing" or "therapeu-
tic"? (This distinction is critical, for example, in determining 
whether the intervention will be covered by health insurance.) How 
should the benefit from a genetic enhancement be calculated in 
comparing its risks and benefits? Would people who have been ge-
netically enhanced enjoy an unfair advantage in competing for 
scarce resources, from sports awards to the allocation of academic 
and professional opportunities? If so, how should these competitions 
be conducted to avoid or reduce the unfairness? Concerns like these 
10. See McDonald, supra note 5, at lA. 
11. See Chinese Takeaway: HGH, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 10, 1998, at 57 (noting 
that while HGH burns fat and promotes bone, connective tissue, and muscle 
growth, the muscle is weak in relation to its size); On the Track of the Drug 
Cheats: The Battle Between the Sports Authorities and Athletes Who B.reak the 
Rules Is Being Fought at Ever Higher Levels, Says Clive Cookson, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 20, 1996, Comment and Analysis, at 9 (noting that Atlanta 
Olympics officials worried about use of HGH by competing athletes). 
12. See Theodore Friedman, Overcoming the Obstacles to Gene Therapy, 
SCI. AM., June 1997, at 96, 97-98. 
13. For an overview of gene insertion techniques, see generally Special Re-
port: Making Gene Therapy Work, SCI. AM., June 1997, at 95, 95-123 (offering 
five articles that outline current developments in genetic technology). The in-
sertion of normal genes or "supergenes" to supplement the working of normal 
genes also can be intended to achieve therapeutic objectives, such as providing 
added immunity to disease. See Eric Juengst, What Does "Enhancement" 
Mean?, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS: ETHICAL AND SociAL IMPLICATIONS (Erick 
Parens ed., 1998). This complicates both the definition of"genetic enhancement" 
and the regulatory response. 
14. See Steve Mirsky & John Rennie, What Cloning Means for Gene Ther-
apy, SCI. AM., June 1997, at 122, 123. 
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arguably would be exacerbated by germ cell genetic enhancement, in 
which these risks and benefits, advantages and harms, would be 
transferred to successive generations. 
As genetic enhancement technology emerges, responses to these 
and similar concerns necessarily will be forthcoming. The nature of 
these responses, and how successfully they resolve the problems 
that they target, will depend in the first instance on identifying the 
responding individuals or institutions, and the principles and deci-
sion-making algorithms that they will employ. 
I. DEFINING GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
Identifying what we mean by genetic enhancement presents two 
major difficulties. First, when is an enhancement "genetic?" Sec-
ond, when is a genetic manipulation "enhancement?" People con-
stantly try to improve themselves and their children by means of 
diet, exercise, education, marriage, job changes, cosmetic surgery, 
and the like. Some of these efforts are successful, at least in part, by 
virtue of the person's genetic endowment. For example, someone 
who has inherited good looks is likely to find it easier to marry 
someone attractive, which may enhance their social standing and 
lead, in turn, to the production of handsome children.15 Getting into 
a prestigious college is influenced by the applicant's aptitude-to 
some degree a matter of genetic endowment. In addition, one's ge-
netic make-up helps determine how much improvement is required 
to achieve a desired effect. Someone who inherits a fine facial bone 
structure, for example, may require less radical plastic surgery to 
continue to appear young than someone with coarser features. 
For purposes of this Article, an enhancement will be deemed 
genetic when it is produced by biotechnological processes, such as by 
a pharmacological product made using recombinant DNA technology 
or by gene insertion. These processes raise significant, new chal-
lenges to our regulatory capabilities. There is little precedent for 
germ cell enhancement engineering modifications at the genetic 
level that biologically affect succeeding generations. Techniques 
such as education and exercise are apt to be far more gradual and 
less pronounced than genetic enhancement. Even the relatively 
rapid changes produced by cosmetic surgery and the use of perform-
ance enhancement drugs in sports lack the potential depth and 
breadth of genetic alteration. 
Obviously, not all genetic interventions will be enhancements. 
Some, indeed almost all at the outset, will aim to treat or to prevent 
disease or disorders. A genetic enhancement, then, refers to an in-
15. While discussing herself and other top models, Linda Evangelista 
stated, 'We were blessed with genetic good fortune, and we have long bodies 
and a lot of us have hardly any body fat .... I hate using this term, but we are 
genetic freaks." Model Says Super Looks Just a Freak of Nature, PLAIN DEALER, 
May 16, 1996, at 2A. 
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tervention that is not undertaken for purposes of treating or pre-
venting diseases or disorders. 16 Instead, an enhancement is aimed at 
improving a characteristic that, but for the enhancement, would be 
within what is generally regarded as a "normal" range,17 or at in-
stalling a characteristic that would not normally be present.18 
II. REGULATORY CONCERNS 
A. Efficacy 
As genetic enhancement technologies are developed, serious 
questions will arise concerning the appropriateness of their use. 
Answers to these questions will depend, in the first instance, on the 
effectiveness of these technologies in achieving their intended ef-
fects. Consider a genetically engineered drug or gene insertion 
technique that purports to improve mental acuity. Does it work? If 
so, how well does it work? The answers to these questions are nec-
essary to enable individuals or regulators to compare the positive 
and negative consequences of the technology in order to decide 
16. There is burgeoning, insightful literature dealing with the distinction 
between enhancement and therapy. See, e.g., LEROY WALTERS & JULIE G. 
PALMER, THE ETIDCS OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1997); Norman Daniels, Growth 
Hormone Therapy for Short Stature: Can We ·Support the Treat-
ment/Enhancement Distinction?, 8 GROWTH GENETICS & HORMONES 46, 46-48 
(Supp. I 1992); Eric T. Juengst, Can Enhancement Be Distinguished from Pre-
vention in Genetic Medicine?, 22 J. MED. & PmL. 125, 125-42 (1997); Eric Par-
ens, The Goodness of Fragility: On the Prospect of Genetic Technologies Aimed 
at the Enhancement of Human Capabilities, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETIDCS J. 141, 
141-51 (1995). As Eric Juengst observes, it is not satisfactory to classifY an in-
tervention as an enhancement merely because the intervention is aimed at im-
proving the functioning of healthy systems and normal traits; like enhance-
ments, preventive medicine, especially immunizations, "'fixes' bodily functions 
that aren't 'broken.'" Juengst, supra note 13, at 33. 
17. The concept of "normalcy'' is so value-laden, arbitrary, and subjective 
that the term must be placed in quotation marks. Typically, it refers to a cer-
tain distribution of the population around an average measure for a particular 
trait. Clinicians generally consider a person to be clinically "short" or "tall" if 
their height is more than two standard deviations from the mean of the popula-
tion. See Werth, supra note 9, § 6, at 14. Since two standard deviations com-
prise, by definition, approximately 95% of the population, 5% of the population 
autom~tically becomes defined as above or below "normal" height. See GARY L. 
TEITJEN, A TOPICAL DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 4-5 (1986). A more sophisticated 
attempt defines "normalcy'' as a level of functionality that allows an individual 
to enjoy the opportunity range typical of their species, an approach championed 
by Norman Daniels. See Daniels, supra note 16, at 47. This approach falters 
when it attempts to delineate the boundary between therapy and enhancement. 
As Eric Juengst observes, Daniels' thesis ·assumes that we can define "species-
typical function" and that an individual's "skills and talents" are fixed according 
to the "natural lottery'' of human genetics, neither of which obtains once genetic 
enhancements become available. See Juengst, supra note 13, at 36. 
18. These might be cosmetic alterations of appearance, such as creating 
human hair or eye colors that were not found in nature. 
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whether or not the benefits are worth the risks. Suppliers of the 
product need efficacy information in order to gauge how much they 
should charge for it. Potential purchasers, whether patient-
consumers or third-party payers, need the information to know 
whether or not the charge is worth it. 
Establishing the efficacy of genetic enhancements will present 
many of the same difficulties as establishing the efficacy of medical 
and biological interventions. The effect of the intervention will have 
to be detected and measured. For enhancements that achieve their 
effect in the next generation, this will necessitate waiting until the 
enhanced person has matured enough to display the effect, if any. 
Measuring the effect will require appropriate instruments and 
standardized scales. In some cases, the degree of the effect that is 
achieved will be measurable in objective terms. The effect of an en-
hancement that improved visual acuity could be ascertained by con-
ventional, standardized techniques such as reading an eye chart. 
Similar tests exist for height, strength, and even memory and intel-
. ligence.19 But some traits that might be the subject of genetic en-
hancement, such as beauty or charisma, do not lend themselves to 
traditional measurement approaches. 20 Perhaps instruments and 
scales for these traits will be developed in the future in response to 
the emergence of enhancement technologies. 
Once the effect of a genetic enhancement technology is meas-
ured, the effect must be valued. For a health effect, the first step 
usually is assessing the effect in terms of its clinical benefit and 
then expressing that benefit in standardized units. Drugs used to 
treat heart attacks, called "clot-busters," are a good example. They 
dissolve blood clots that interfere with circulation to the heart mus-
cle, causing the infarct or heart attack. Determining their efficacy, 
however, requires more than simply ascertaining if they dissolve 
blood clots, for that is only a means to achieve their clinical benefits: 
reducing the severity of the heart attack, preventing a recurrence, 
easing discomfort, increasing recovery time, restoring functionality, 
and, ultimately, prolonging life. These effects must be measured 
over many years if the question is how well the drugs prolong life.21 
19. See, e.g., CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL AsSESSMENT: A COGNITIVE 
APPROACH (Robert L. Mapou & Jack Spector eds., 1995) (discussing neuropsy-
chological testing); ALAN S. KAUFMAN, AsSESSING ADOLESCENT AND ADULT 
INTELLIGENCE (1990) (discussing intelligence tests); MUSCLE STRENGTH TESTING: 
INSTRUMENTED AND NON-INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS (Louis R. Amundson ed., 1990) 
(testing muscle strength in physical therapy settings). Even these tests are 
subjective in that they depend upon the cooperation of and the accurate per-
formance by the subject. 
20. Cf John T. Molloy, Acquiring Charisma Demands a Change in Attitude, 
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1995, at 7 (declaring that the only way to measure cha-
risma is in terms of its effect); Simon Perry, That's Beauty Baby: Why Good 
Looks Dazzle Even Those Only Three Months Old, EVENING STANDARD (London), 
May 28, 1996, at 3 (testing for the effects that beauty has on infants). 
21. See BARUCH A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND 
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Finally, in order to compare the effectiveness of different interven-
tions, clinical benefit must be expressed in standardized ways, such 
as in terms of providing additional years oflife. 
Up to this point, we have been largely objective. We measure 
effects such as functionality, recovery time and prolongation of life 
by observation, and we protect against observer bias by various 
techniques such as blinding the observers to whether the patients 
they are evaluating have or have not received the experimental mo-
dality. But we also employ subjective measures, such as relief from 
pain. Most importantly, the ultimate value that we place on the ob-
served benefits is subjective: an additional year of life, for example, 
may be worth more to one person than to another.22 
The same tasks would be necessary in assessing the efficacy of 
genetic enhancements. We would need to evaluate their effect not 
only in terms of the magnitude of their direct impact-extra inches 
of height or IQ points, for example-but in terms of the ultimate 
benefits that these effects produced: the increased probability of be-
coming a professional basketball player or of getting into Harvard. 
In addition, we would need to place a value on being a professional 
basketball player or a Harvard graduate. This value is likely to 
PRICING 23 (1995) (discussing concept of clinical efficacy). 
22. Researchers have struggled to develop ways to standardize these val-
ues. One approach attempts to convert benefits into a scale based on the per-
son's willingness to pay for them. For example, if a person would be willing to 
pay $10,000 for an additional year of life and only $5000 for a year of restored 
function, then we can conclude that they value life above functionality. How-
ever, this system breaks down when we extend it to more than one individual, 
as we might if we were a regulatory agency determining whether the benefit 
from a genetic technology exceeded the risk. In this case, the willingness to pay 
approach falsely assumes that everyone has the same wealth and needs, so that 
a sum of money-say $10,000-is worth the same to all. See generally Eliza-
beth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay us. Willingness to Ac-
cept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 61-97 (1993) 
(analyzing divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay 
models); Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Sur-
vive?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 876, 886-91 (1989) (explaining willingness to pay ap-
proach and its use in regulatory analysis); Dennis C. Taylor, Your Money or 
Your Life?: Thinking About the Use of Willingness-to-Pay Studies to Calculate 
Hedonic Damages, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519, 1552-55 (1994) (criticizing 
willingness to pay approach for majority of torts contexts). The subjectivity of 
valuing benefit confounds another standardization technique, called quality-
adjusted life years ("QAL Y s"), which attempts to adjust the additional years of 
life produced by a medical intervention in order to take into account the pa-
tient's quality oflife. Valuing different qualities of life is highly subjective; the 
state of being deaf may be much worse for a musician, for example, than for a 
computer programmer. In fact, advocates for persons with disabilities contend 
that disabilities are often valued as more serious detriments than they are per-
ceived by those who have them. See Alexander M. Capron, Oregon's Disability: 
Principles or Politics?, HASTINGS CTR. RPT., Nov. 1992, at 18; Paul T. Menzel, 
Oregon's Denial: Disabilities and Quality of Life, HASTINGS CTR. RPT., Nov. 
1992, at 21. 
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vary substantially from person to person. 
An analogy might be cosmetic surgery. How would we establish 
that the surgery was efficacious? One way would be to construct a 
visual image of the desired outcome and compare it to the surgical 
result. But one could argue that we have still failed to measure the 
ultimate effect, such as whether the patient gains a better self-
image or is more successful at business or at attracting a mate. 
These effects are highly subjective, as was recognized by a panel of 
outside experts advising the FDA on the efficacy of liposuction de-
vices.23 The panel decided that it could only characterize the bene-
fits from these devices in terms of patient satisfaction.24 
In one respect, moreover, evaluating the efficacy of genetic en-
hancements is likely to prove particularly difficult: valid and reli-
able efficacy data for genetic enhancement technologies are likely to 
be extremely scarce. This will be the case for two reasons. First, 
depending on how genetic enhancement is achieved, providers and 
suppliers may not be required to submit safety and efficacy data to 
the government and obtain government approval before marketing 
enhancement technologies. To the extent that genetic enhancement 
is deemed a surgical or medical procedure, as opposed to the ad-
ministration of a drug, biological, or medical device,25 it will not re-
quire prior approval by the FDA, which would be based on adequate 
and well-controlled clinical investigations. 26 Without being required 
to submit this data, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the enor-
mous expense of creating it.27 More importantly, even if regulators 
regard genetic enhancements as drugs, biologicals, or medical de-
vices, these technologies are likely to emerge first as unapproved or 
"off-label" uses of therapeutic technologies-that is, uses for which 
the manufacturers are not labeling or promoting the technologies-
and manufacturers are not required to conduct clinical 
investigations to support such uses. 28 The experience with HGH, 
23. See Notice of Panel Recommendation, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,195-96 (1996) 
(giving notice that the FDA General Surgery and Plastic Surgery Devices Panel 
voted to reclassify liposuction devices from Class III to Class II). 
24. See id. at 58,197. 
25. For a description of these different modalities and a discussion of the 
differences in their regulation by the FDA, see infra Section III. E. 
26. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 321(g)(1), (h) (Law. Co-op. 1997) (defining require-
ments for drugs and medical devices); 42 U.S.C.S. § 262 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & 
Supp. 1999) (outlining current regulation of biological products). 
27. It is estimated that it costs an average of $359 million to research a 
new drug and send it through the FDA approval process. See Theresa Beeby 
Lewis, Comment, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey 
of the Patent Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L LAw. 835, 842 (1996). 
28. However, manufacturers and providers are required by the FDA to 
submit reports of adverse events that occur in connection with the use of their 
products, whether through approved or unapproved uses. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 
360i (Law. Co-op. 1997). Prior to mandatory reporting, some amount of safety 
data would be available, although it is not clear how complete this information 
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mentioned earlier, is a good example. The drug was approved by the 
FDA for use in individuals who were deficient in growth hormone. 
Nevertheless, pediatric endocrynologists began prescribing it for 
other individuals with short stature. There are reports that parents 
are seeking the drug-and no doubt obtaining it-for use in children 
who are of normal height and even for use in some who are tall, in 
the hopes that the drug will enable them to grow tall enough to be-
come successful basketball players.29 Efficacy data exists for the ap-
proved use of HGH, but there are likely to be only unconfirmed re-
ports from uncontrolled case studies for the off-label uses.30 
B. Adverse Effects 
The same difficulties in determining the efficacy of genetic en-
ha.Tlcements will interfere with assessing their risks. The likelihood 
that genetic enhancement will not trigger regulatory requirements 
applicable to drugs, biologics, or medical devices or that enhance-
ment technologies will emerge as unapproved uses of approved 
drugs and devices will limit the availability of safety and efficacy in-
formation. Safety information may be especially deficient since the 
hazards of genetic enhancement may only manifest themselves in 
succeeding generations, and therefore may not be apparent for many 
years. Even if safety data were available, standardized measure-
ment tools are lacking for effects such as pain. Furthermore, the 
valuation of harms, like that of benefits, is subjective; the shorten-
ing of life by a year, for example, may be viewed much more seri-
ously by one person than another. 
These limitations confound the central regulatory function of 
comparing risks and benefits. No intervention is completely safe; 
even the most innocuous treatment carries with it some element of 
risk however improbable or trivial. The question is whether the ex-
pected benefit is worth the potential risk. Given the problems in as-
sessing the safety and efficacy of genetic enhancements, the most 
that may be possible may be to compare the risks involved in em-
ploying different means to achieve similar enhancement effects. For 
example, suppose that eye color can be changed using either genetic 
manipulation or colored contact lenses. Holding the desired benefit 
constant-producing a certain eye color-may allow us to compare 
the hazards without as much uncertainty and subjectivity as if we 
would be since reporting of adverse events is not rigorously enforced. See, e.g., 
Kathleen Kerr, FDA Didn't Link Heart-valve Damage to Diet Drugs, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at A2 (criticizing FDA for limited follow-up of serious ad-
verse event reports). 
29. See Rita Rubin, Giving Growth a Synthetic Hand: Use of Hormone 
Sparks Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 7, 1986, at lA. 
30. The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 changed the law to permit manu-
facturers to distribute literature on unapproved uses of drugs so long as the 
manufacturers are conducting studies intended to lead to eventual approval for 
the uses. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360aaa (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
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were comparing, say, changing eye color versus increasing height. 
Yet even this limited comparison of risks assumes that safety data 
are known. 
Still, these problems also beset the regulation of technologies 
other than genetic enhancement. For example, the FDA is con-
stantly struggling with the problem of regulating off-label uses of 
drugs and devices.31 The gaps in the regulation of medical and sur-
gical interventions, as opposed to new drugs and devices, is well-
known and much-lamented.32 The subjectivity of risk is a funda-
mental complication in all types of regulatory decision-making.33 
These problems may be exacerbated in the case of genetic enhance-
31. Off-label use within the medical community is accepted as part of a 
physician's discretion and considered essential to medical care. The FDA ac-
knowledges the need for this discretion as do courts and Congress, which en-
acted legislation to prohibit FDA intrusion into medical practice by restricting 
off-label use. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 396 (Law. Co-op. 1997); James M. Beck & Eliza-
beth D. Azari, FDA, Off-label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and 
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 78 (1998). The FDA encounters prob-
lems regulating off-label use because it can be hard to draw the line between 
the legitimate flow of information (which is part of a doctor's practice and there-
fore not subject to FDA regulation) and a manufacturer's promotion of off-label 
use strictly for profit. See William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: 
Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248-51 (1993). A fed-
eral district court ruled in July 1998 that the FDA's present rules regulating 
the dissemination of information regarding off-label use constituted a restric-
tion of commercial free speech. See Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 
F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by, 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), 
and amended by, 36 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999). The court approved an in-
junction blocking enforcement of the existing rules. See id. at 74-75. This deci-
sion allows manufacturers to inform physician of uses of products even if those 
uses have not been approved by the FDA, subject to certain conditions. See 
Federal Court Holds FDA May Not Restrict Information Involving Off-Label Use 
of Drugs, 7 HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) 1243 (Aug. 6, 1998). 
32. New surgical procedures are typically subject only to approval from an 
institutional review board. See Jodi K. Fredrickson, He's All Heart .. . And a 
Little Pig Too: A Look at the FDA Draft Xenotransplant Guideline, 52 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 429, 438-43 (1997). However, the vast development of biotechnology 
products is pushing the limits of the FDA's definitions and approaches to regu-
lation and challenging the traditional notion that the FDA doesn't regulate 
medical procedures. The dividing line as to the FDA's jurisdiction has become 
blurred by new cellular and related therapies that are often developed by proc-
essing cells and tissues. See Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regu-
lation: Past, Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 145-
47 (1995); see also Jack M. Kress, Xenotransplantation: Ethics and Economics, 
53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 353, 381-84 (1998) (explaining that some transplant phy-
sicians argue xenotransplantation doesn't fall within FDA's jurisdiction because 
it is a surgical procedure and not a regulatory product). 
33. Conclusive, direct evidence that a particular drug or device will 
threaten human health is rare. For example, science can establish the effects of 
high doses of formaldehyde in mice, ''but quantification of the effects of low 
doses on humans currently lies beyond the reach of science." Wendy E. Wagner, 
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1619 
(1995). 
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ment because of its novelty and the dearth of relevant data. But, by 
themselves, they do not indicate that the regulation of genetic en-
hancement would be fundamentally different than the regulation of 
other technologies, nor that regulating genetic enhancement would 
require the development of new regulatory approaches or entities. 
Yet genetic enhancement does raise a host of truly unprece-
dented risks that are noteworthy not only for their novelty but for 
their subtlety. For, unlike the risks from traditional therapeutic in-
terventions, which predominantly involve health hazards to the in-
dividual receiving the therapy, the principal risks from genetic en-
hancement are risks to third parties. They fall into three main 
categories: threats to social equality, "cheating," and the loss of per-
sonal autonomy. Let us turn to this last category first. 
1. Personal Autonomy 
Genetic enhancement threatens personal autonomy when it is 
imposed on persons without their consent. This could occur if en-
hancement were mandated by the government, say as part of a 
eugenics program, but a more likely scenario would be when a par-
ent genetically enhanced a fetus or child, or when a person opted for 
germ cell enhancement for themselves or their offspring. These 
cases raise concerns because the effects of the enhancements, both 
positive and negative, are not chosen by those whom they will affect, 
and might not be chosen by them if they were given the choice. 
We have had considerable experience with this problem in con-
texts other than genetic enhancement. Similar issues arise when 
medical treatment decisions are contemplated for persons who can-
not make those decisions for themselves, such as when persons are 
unconscious;34 when parents make treatment or lifestyle decisions 
for their children;35 when researchers propose to experiment on em-
34. With respect to persons who are unconscious, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that the only practical way to prevent destruction of an uncon-
scious patient's right to privacy is to permit the guardian and family to make 
their best judgment as to how the patient would exercise her judgment. See In 
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (involving a father who sought tore-
move extraordinary treatment from daughter who was in persistent vegetative 
state). Furthermore, if the decision is to forgo treatment, then it should be a 
decision acceptable to a society in which the overwhelming majority would 
make the same choice in similar circumstances. See id. 
35. Parental autonomy is constitutionally protected. The United States 
Supreme Court has extended the concept of a right to privacy to child rearing. 
See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). ''Parental autonomy, however, is not absolute." In re 
Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802 (1979) (holding that the parents had a right 
to refuse surgery for their child with Down's syndrome even though it would 
significantly expand his life span and improve his physical functioning). Be-
cause the state has an interest in preserving life, if parents fail to provide their 
children with adequate care, the state is justified to intervene. However, since 
parental rights are sacred, they should only be invaded for the most compelling 
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bryos, fetuses, children, or persons who are mentally incompetent;36 
in connection with abortion;37 and in treatment decisions by or for 
pregnant women that may affect their fetuses. 38 We respond to 
these situations in general by first trying to ascertain the wishes of 
the affected person or persons whenever possible and however im-
perfectly, such as by seeking statements by them of what they would 
prefer in related situations (the inaptly-named "substituted judg-
ment" approach),39 or by estimating what they would choose for 
themselves if they could do so, given what we know about them. If 
it is impossible to tell what the affected individual would have 
wanted, such as when the individual is in utero, the decision is made 
based on what "we" (society, family members, caregivers, legislators, 
judges, juries, ethics committee members-whoever is making or re-
viewing the decision) would want done if we were in the same cir-
·reason. See id. In order to intervene, the state has the "burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that intervening in the parent-child relationship 
is necessary to ensure the safety or health of the child, or to protect the public 
at large." Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1990) (allowing 
Christian Scientist parents to refuse chemotherapy to treat their child's cancer). 
Parents also have a right to decide their child's lifestyle to a degree. See Yoder, 
406 U.S. at 211, 234-35 (holding that Amish parents have a right to teach their 
children the "specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer 
or housewife"). 
36. A mental illness does not necessarily mean that a person is incompe-
tent. A mentally ill patient can still retain the ability to communicate and un-
derstand information. A patient diagnosed with schizophrenia still has the 
right to refuse treatment if her decision is made while she is competent. See 
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 499 (4th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, life-
sustaining treatment can be removed from an incompetent patient if it is clear 
that the patient would have wanted it removed. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985). The decision "should be that which would be made by 
the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account 
the present and future incompetence of the individual as one of the factors 
which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the compe-
tent person." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977). 
37. See Mary Mahowald & Virginia Abernethy, When a Mentally Ill Woman 
Refuses Abortion, HASTINGS CTR. REP., April 1985, at 22 (discussing a chronic 
paranoid schizophrenic woman's choice to continue her pregnancy against the 
advice of her mother who has legal custody). 
38. See VAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding 
that it was not appropriate for courts or employers to decide whether women 
should have children despite the fact that women, through their jobs, were ex-
posed to lead which threatened the health of their fetuses); THOMAS H. MURRAY, 
THE WORTH OF A CHILD 96-115 (1996) (arguing that each individual should do 
her own balancing, considering all relevant factors as opposed to society treat-
ing pregnancy as a "moral trump card"). 
39. The substituted judgment approach, also known as the limited-objective 
test, states that "life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn ... 
when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused 
the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the bur-
dens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the bene-
fits .... " Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
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cumstances (the ''best interests" approach).40 Only in rare and con-
troversial instances do we permit the interests of the affected indi-
vidual to be overridden, such as in the case of abortion (where we 
sometimes content ourselves with the fiction that the affected entity 
has no real legal interests).41 
Most importantly, we require decision-makers to act cautiously 
in these situations. Seldom can they act hastily or alone. Parents or 
family members seeking to make a treatment decision for a non-
autonomous individual usually must consult at least a physician, 
and a physician usually must consult parents or next-of-kin. Review 
by a hospital ethics committee may be required. Researchers must 
obtain permission from an institutional review board and possibly 
from the FDA or NIH. In some jurisdictions, certain steps can only 
be taken pursuant to a court order.42 
Similarly, we might expect that the regulation of genetic en-
hancement would include procedural protections for those who were 
proposed to be enhanced, but who could not choose for themselves. 
For example, parents might be required to get someone's permis-
40. The best interests approach, also known as the objective standard, in-
corporates what society considers to be reasonable medical choices. This stan-
dard is used when there is no evidence of an incompetent patient's former 
treatment preferences. See Rebecca Dresser, Bioethics and the Law (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). To justify removal of life-saving medi-
cal treatment, the burdens oo the patient's life with the treatment must clearly 
outweigh the benefits that the patient would derive from the treatment. In ad-
dition to this, there must be "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain ... such 
that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane." 
Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
41. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 
76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 444-46 (1996) (explaining how those who view the fetus as 
having no legal interests may not oppose abortion of fetuses with disabilities or 
abortion for gender selection). · 
42. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts outlined the required procedures 
for deciding whether to give or withhold life-prolonging treatment for an incom-
petent patient. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432-34. The court held that the 
first step was to petition for the appointment of a guardian or temporary 
guardian in Probate Court. Although the Probate Court was the proper court to 
determine the best interests of the incompetent patient, the appointed guardian 
ad litem was responsible for investigating the situation and representing the 
interests of the patient. If the judge, after listening to the guardian's report, 
was satisfied that the incompetent person would not have chosen treatment, 
then the judge would order treatment to be withheld. He would refuse to issue 
such an order if he was not satisfied that the patient would have so chosen or if 
he felt that the interests of the State required treatment. In developing this 
procedure, the Massachusetts Supreme Court expressly rejected the approach 
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan, which had held the 
decision should be entrusted to the patients, guardians, family, doctors, and 
hospital ethics committees. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 434; see also John D. 
Hodson, Annotation, Judicial Power to Order Discontinuance of Life- Sustaining 
Treatment, 48 A.L.R.4TH 67 (1998) (analyzing federal and state cases in which 
courts have discussed under what conditions judicial authority exists to order 
discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients). 
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sion, such as an ethics committee's or a court's, before they could 
enhance their children (whether before or after conception or birth). 
Such a regimen would require three components: (1) a set of deci-
sion-making rules; (2) a procedural mechanism, such as a court or a 
public or private administrative body; and (3) an enforcement 
method, including monitoring and sanctions. 
Whatever "rules" or principles parents might justifiably use in 
deciding whether to pursue enhancements will depend in part on 
the particulars of the enhancement technologies in question. Some 
"enhancements" primarily will be for the child's benefit, while others 
may be directed more towards the parents' advantage or preference. 
Some enhancement technologies may ca..-rry ver.f little risk to the 
children on whom they are used, while others may be quite risky. 
The guiding principles will rely on our conceptions of good parent-
child relationships, on the values at the core of those relationships, 
and on the impact particular forms of enhancement technologies 
have on those values. 
Procedural dec~sion-making and enforcement mechanisms will 
be discussed below, t first, we need to address the two other major 
"safety" concerns: thr ts to social equality and "cheating." Both of 
these remaining social concerns stem from the fact that genetic en-
hancement will not readily be available to everyone. The primary 
roadblock will be cost. 43 Prenatal and germ cell enhancements most 
likely will involve expensive techniques such as in vitro fertilization 
("IVF"), in addition to the cost of the enhancements themselves. IVF 
alone now costs an average of $38,000 per delivery. 44 Even somatic 
cell enhancement, which might be accomplished with drugs or drug-
like techniques, is likely to be too expensive for most people to afford 
out-of-pocket. For a twenty kilogram child, growth hormone therapy 
costs approximately $14,000 per year.45 Most people will need to 
rely on insurance to cover the costs of enhancement. If public and 
private health insurance coverage of analogous technologies today is 
43. Other impediments will be infertility or post-reproduction age, in which 
cases germ cell enhancement will not be possible. Yet the age at which a 
woman can bear a child is advancing, and techniques such as cloning may en-
able reproduction to take place in cases where it is now impossible. The birth 
rate among women aged 30-34 rose from 61.9 per 1000 women in 1980 to 79.5 in 
1991. See STEPHANIE J. VENTURA ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, Trends in Pregnancies and Pregnancy Rates: Estimates for the United 
States, 1980-92, in MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP. at 1, 7 (May 25, 1995). For 
an in-depth discussion of the reproductive possibilities of cloning technology, 
see LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW 
WORLD (1997); Melinda Faier, Cloning Breeds Contempt and Adulation: Now All 
Women May Have a Chance to Bring up Baby, Cm. TRm., Mar. 7, 1997, Com-
mentary, at 23. 
44. New York Taskforce Report 60. 
45. Beth 8. Finkelstein et al., Insurance Coverage, Physician Recommenda-
tions, and Access to Emerging Treatments: Growth Hormone Therapy for Child-
hood Short Stature, 279 JAMA 663, 663 (1998). 
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any indication, however, genetic enhancement will not be covered by 
most insurance policies.46 
In case there is any doubt on this point, consider currently 
available products or services that might be thought of as "en-
hancements": cosmetics, cosmetic medicine and surgery, private 
education, fitness centers and trainers, and so on.47 All of these 
must be purchased with personal funds rather than with funds fur-
nished by third parties such as insurers or the government.48 
Cosmetic surgery offers perhaps the best illustration. Medicare, 
for example, does not cover "items or services ... which are not rea-
sonable and necessary for the treatment of illness or injury, or to 
improve the functioning of a malformed body member," and there is 
an express statutory exclusion for "cosmetic surgery."49 The same 
exclusions appear in private health insurance policies. An inter-
esting consequence is that patients and their care-givers attempt to 
portray cosmetic interventions as necessary for the patient's mental 
and physical well-being in order to compel third-party payment. An 
illustration comes from an Idaho case, Viveros u. Idaho Dept. of 
Health and Welfare, 50 in which the state Medicaid program denied 
coverage of otoplastic surgery for an eight-year-old boy with unusu-
ally large ears.51 The child's physicians attempted to portray the 
surgery as necessary for the child's self-esteem and not just to im-
prove his appearance, but the state's rejection of their argument was 
upheld by the court. 52 
Although analogous services are not covered by current third-
party payment systems, genetic enhancement is liable to be viewed 
as extremely desirable, especially if it is perceived to be relatively 
safe for the enhanced individual. Theoretically, genetic enhance-
ment could improve any inherited trait, such as strength, stamina, 
height, weight, body type, beauty, intelligence, and even those that 
are multifactorial (that is, the product of the interaction of more 
than one gene) and those that are substantially affected by the indi-
vidual's environment.53 The demand for genetic enhancement, ac-
46. For a more extensive discussion of insurance limitations for genetic 
technologies, see MAxwELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE 
GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 62-87 (1998). 
47. The list focuses on products or services to exclude self-enhancement 
through, say, diet, exercise, or reading. Genetic enhancements will be provided, 
not self-generated. 
48. The only exceptions might be training and fitness services provided by 
employers to boost productivity or by educational institutions or national sports 
associations to increase institutional or national prestige, and some degree of 
enhancement through social interactions such as "marrying up." Yet these en-
hancements also are available only to a few. 
49. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395y(a)(1)(A), (a)(10) (Law. Co-op. 1993). 
50. 889 P.2d 1104 (Idaho 1995). 
51. Id. at 1105. 
52. See id. at 1107. 
53. There is a vigorous debate among scientists and social scientists over 
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cordingly, will be enormous. But this does not mean that third-
party payers will add it to their list of covered services. The cost is 
likely to be enormous as well. Moreover, the very desirability of the 
services tends to disqualify them as candidates for true insurance 
coverage. There is no point in insuring a population for an expense 
that it is certain to incur, since the premium would be the same as 
the cost.54 Public progra,rns like Medicare and Medicaid might con-
sider using government funds to cover genetic enhancement for 
those who could not otherwise afford them. The foregoing objection 
to regarding coverage of genetic enhancement as insurance could be 
eliminated if this coverage was viewed more as a redistribution of 
wealth via progressive taxation than as an insurance plan funded by 
enrollee premiums. Still, it is highly unlikely that the government 
would be able to afford the provision of genetic enhancement to eve-
rybody who might wish to obtain it. Even if it cost only $10,000,55 
the degree to which genes or the environment control individual destiny-the 
so-called "nature versus nurture" controversy. Francis Galton, Charles Dar-
win's cousin, coined the phrase nature-nurture. His view was that "nature pre-
vail[ed] enormously over nurture .... " ROBERT PLOMIN, GENETICS AND 
EXPERIENCE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATURE AND NURTURE 2-3 (1994) (quoting 
FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 241 
(1883)). Galton thought environment played a minor role in behavioral devel-
opment. People in this school of thought became known as "hereditarians." The 
"environmentalists" argued that there was "no such thing as an inheritance of 
capacity, talent, temperament, mental constitution and characteristics" and 
that the environment determined our behavior. ld. at 3 (quoting J.B. WATSON, 
BEHAVIORISM 74 (1925)). Today, there is probably not a single scientist that 
would assert that behavior is ruled completely by the environment or com-
pletely by genetics. Research in the field of behavioral genetics has shown that 
"genetic influence is significant and substantial for most areas of behavioral de-
velopment, even though it is not true that 'nature prevails enormously over 
nurture'." I d. Some argue that this conclusion leads to problems in and of itself. 
See Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the Broader 
Harm of Geneticisim, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 350 (1995) (pointing out that 
those who assert the importance of genetic factors are criticized by others for 
their "genetic discrimination" or "geneticism"). Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that even if genes are not the whole story, in that environmental conditions 
may moderate or modify genetic interventions, genetic manipulation will have a 
substantial impact on individual ability. See Natalie Angier, Separated by 
Birth?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, § 7, at 9 (mentioning the work of Thomas J. 
Bouchard, who conducted twin research at the University of Minnesota to study 
the effect of genes versus the environment, as well as his recent conclusion that 
the consensus figure for various studies is a heritability of 66% for IQ scores 
where heritability refers to the degree to which the difference between two peo-
ple with regard to a trait is ascribed to genetic, rather than environmental fac-
tors). 
54. Even life insurance, which arguably insures people against a certain 
event, depends for its profitability on betting on when the insured's death will 
occur. 
55. The consensus seems to be that IVF costs at least $10,000 for each try. 
The national average for IVF programs is 20%, that is, there is a 20% chance 
that one egg in several will lead to a pregnancy, but not necessarily a baby. See 
generally Kristina Brenneman, 20 Years of In Vitro Test Tube Births Still Rais-
1999] REGULATING GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 687 
and if only fifty million Americans sought coverage, the bill would be 
more than $500 billion. Furthermore, this would not be a one-time 
cost, since people might seek enhancement for each one of their chil-
dren.56 
The result, then, is that genetic enhancement will not be avail-
able to all, but only to the few who can afford to purchase it out of 
their personal finances. This, in turn, leads to the two major threats 
presented by genetic enhancement: the undermining of the principle 
of social equality that forms the foundation of Western democratic 
societies, and the related problem of "cheating"-the unfair advan-
tage enjoyed by enhanced individuals in competitions for scarce so-
cietal resources. 
2. Social Inequality 
In the worst case scenario, unequal access to genetic enhance-
ment will divide society into the enhanced and the un-enhanced. 
Germ cell enhancement will perpetuate enhancements from genera-
tion to generation, creating a hereditary aristocracy or "genobility." 
Added to their wealth, a prerequisite to being able to afford genetic 
enhancement, will be the advantages conferred by the enhance-
ments themselves. The result will be a group of privileged individu-
als and families whose position in society will be virtually unassail-
able.57 
This will pose grave threats to our political and social structure. 
The belief in social equality, reflected in the words of the Declara-
tion of Independence that "all men are created equal," is the glue 
that holds our society together. 58 In the face of the evident dispari-
ties between us, we rely on the notion of equality of opportunity. 
ing Questions, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), July 27, 1998, at 1 (explaining 
improvements in IVF technology). 
56. One can imagine various efforts by the government to reduce this cost, 
such as limiting the number of children a person could have or the number of 
children who could be enhanced, but these all require government controls on 
private life that are unprecedented and extremely difficult to enforce. 
57. The number of non-enhanced persons who become able to move upward 
into this social stratum is likely to be extremely limited, comprising only those 
who somehow accumulate enough wealth to purchase enhancements for them-
selves or their children, or who are able to marry into the genobility. See 
MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 46, at 99. 
58. See, e.g., FRANK PARKIN, CLASS INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL ORDER: 
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN CAPITALIST AND COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 48 (1971). Par-
kin writes: 
I d. 
Inequality in the distribution of rewards is always a potential source 
of political and social instability. Because upper, relatively advan-
taged strata are generally fewer in number than disadvantaged lower 
strata, the former are faced with crucial problems of social control 
over the latter. One way of approaching this issue is to ask not why 
the unprivileged often rebel against the privileged but why they do 
not rebel more often than they do. 
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What matters is not that we are the same, or even that we are 
equal, so long as we believe that we have just as good an opportunity 
to succeed as the next person.59 
Genetic enhancement of the few threatens the belief in equality 
of opportunity in three crucial ways. First, it increases actual ine-
qualities between the enhanced and the "unadvantaged." Second, it 
gives the enha,nced opportunities that others do not have, and that, 
in the case of germ cell enhancement, may be passed on to succeed-
ing generations. Third, it freezes up the crucial safety valve of up-
ward social mobility. The enhanced would tend to monopolize desir-
able occupations and fill high status social roles. The unadvantaged 
no longer would be able to count on traditional methods of social ad-
vancement, such as education and intermarriage, to improve their 
social standing. 
The destruction of the belief in equality of opportunity threat-
ens the foundations of our democratic order. Societies characterized 
by inherited, largely fixed social status are no stranger to the hu-
man condition, as evinced by feudalism, caste systems, and slavery. 
None of these states are compatible with Western democratic insti-
tutions. 
3. ((Cheating" 
The preceding section dealt with the concern that the fact that 
only some people will be able to afford enhancement will create a so-
cietal division along genetic lines that threatens the fabric of demo-
cratic society. On a more specific level, it presents fairness problems 
in competitions for scarce societal benefits. These benefits include 
jobs, education, "good" marriages, and social status, as well as the 
routine, arms-length business and social transactions of daily life. 
Imagine evaluating the results of a law school admissions test ad-
ministered to a group of applicants some of whom had genetically-
enhanced cognitive functioning. Imagine a business or legal nego-
tiation in which one party was represented by such an enhanced in-
dividual and the other was not. 
We have some experience with this problem in the context of the 
use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports. Tom Murray, who 
serves on the United States Olympic Committee's advisory group, 
has written extensively on the difficulties of enforcing a no-drug 
policy in Olympic competition.60 In part, the problem of perform-
59. See, e.g., David B. Grusky & Azumi A Takata, Social Stratification, in 
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 1955, 1965 (Edgar F. Borgatta & Marie 1. Bor-
gatta eds., 1992) (''Whereas most Americans are willing to tolerate sizeable ine-
qualities in the distribution of resources, they typically insist that individuals 
from all backgrounds should have an equal opportunity to secure these re-
sources."). 
60. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Drugs, Sports and Ethics, in FEELING 
GOOD AND DOING BETTER: ETIDCS AND NON-THERAPEUTIC DRUG USE 107 (Thomas 
H. Murray et al. eds., 1984). 
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ance-enhancing drugs in sports is a problem of definition. The 
Olympics, for example, might be said to define its competition as 
being between non-drug-takers, with the gold medal going to the 
best drug-free athlete. A different competition that did not prohibit 
drug use might define its winner simply as, say, the fastest or 
strongest person. In fact, a division along these lines already has 
occurred in professional weight lifting, where there are drug-free 
and "open" events.61 
Similarly, we could attempt to redefine competition for scarce 
societal benefits to accommodate the possibility that some contest-
ants would be genetically enhanced and others would not. We could 
establish an admissions quota for enhanced college applicants, for 
example. Or, we could decide that being genetically enhanced was 
irrelevant in that it was not substantially different than other ad-
vantages that we ignore, such as being born into a wealthy family. 
What is the difference, for example, between being able to afford the 
best trainer in the world, which is allowed in the Olympics, and 
taking anabolic steroids, which is prohibited? In either case, some 
athletes possess a significant advantage over others. 
In seeking to regulate genetic enhancement, in any event, soci-
ety must attend not only to the traditional regulatory concerns of 
safety and efficacy, but to the problems of social inequality and 
cheating posed by the lack of universal access to enhancement tech-
nologies. Indeed, the problems of social inequality and cheating may 
well pose the greater threats. 
III. POTENTIAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
When we think of regulating an activity associated with medical 
interventions, we probably think first of traditional options such as 
the FDA or state medical licensing boards. These entities no doubt 
will play an important role. But we must not overlook other types of 
regulatory activity. As we will see, traditional regulatory actors 
may be ill-suited to respond to the special concerns raised by genetic 
enhancement. 
A. Self-Regulation 
Persons considering genetic enhancement for themselves or 
61. See generally Ira Berkow, This Lifter Is Fueled by Natural Power; Op-
erating in a Drug-Free Environment, Ted Sobel Is Soaring Above the Field, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, § 8, at 2 (describing how drug-free or natural competitions 
such as the World Natural Power Lifting Championships are a relatively recent 
phenomenon); Olga Connolly, Steroid Debate: 'Enhanced' us. Natural Athletes, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1988, at Z15 (explaining that two separate categories of 
champions have been established in power lifting, "open" and "natural"); Roger 
Mills, 562-pound Lift Makes Ferrantelli a Champ, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 
5, 1997, at 4. (describing how Mike Ferrantelli placed first in both the open and 
drug-free portions of a power lifting competition). 
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their offspring (and being able to afford it) may decline to go forward 
for a host of reasons. For example, a parent may feel that the en-
hancement choice ought to be left up to the child rather than be 
made by the parent. Although this would preclude germ cell and 
other pre-natal enhancements, parents might choose this option if 
effective somatic cell enhancement-the kind that can be done for 
adults-were available. This in turn suggests that, if we are wor-
ried about the hazards of germ cell enhancement, including the so-
cietal worries described in the preceding section, we should make 
sure that somatic enhancements are safe and effective, such as by 
devoting public research funds to their development. Parents also 
might resist germ cell enhancements for ethical or religious reasons, 
or because they feel an obligation to help prevent the social disloca-
tions that might result from the creation of a "genobility" with in-
herited enhancement advantages. The same concerns might moti-
vate individuals contemplating somatic enhancements for 
themselves. In all these cases, individual decision-making acts as a 
decisive regulatory mechanism. 
Self-regulation becomes critical when we recall the earlier dis-
cussion concerning the uncertainties and subjective valuation of the 
risks and benefits of genetic enhancement. These factors call for 
leaving the choice of whether or not to proceed up to the affected in-
dividual. In medical decision making, this is known as the principle 
of informed consent. The patient is deemed to be the best gauge of 
her own values, preferences, and aversion to risk; armed with accu-
rate, comprehensible information provided by health professionals, 
the patient should be allowed to decide, at least in broad terms, 
what will or will not be done for her.62 
62. In Natanson u. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960), the Kansas Su-
preme Court stated: 
Anglo-American law starts with the premise ofthorough-going self de-
termination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his 
own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the 
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doc-
tor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desir-
able or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his 
own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or decep-
tion. 
The court continued by adopting the standard applied in Salgo u. Leland Stan-
ford Jr. University Board of Trustees: 
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to li-
ability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis 
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. 
Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a pro-
cedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the 
same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above 
all else and this very fact places him in a position in which he some-
times must choose between two alternative courses of action. One is 
to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical pro-
cedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in 
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Traditionally, we have abridged the ii"ldividual's freedom of 
choice only in three situations: (1) when the individual is incompe-
tent to choose, (2) when the choice will have a significant impact on 
the welfare of others, and (3) when leaving the choice up to the indi-
vidual would be so inefficient that we delegate the decision to a bet-
ter decision-maker. All three of these factors may affect our will-
ingness to allow individuals to decide whether or not to obtain 
genetic enhancement. For example, in the same way that many 
question the appropriateness of permitting minors to obtain an 
abortion without parental consent, we may question minors' right to 
choose to enhance themselves. As suggested earlier, we might want 
to circumscribe the right of parents to enhance their children, on the 
ground that the children ought to be allowed to make this decision 
for themselves. This is particularly likely if enhancement carries 
with it significant risks to the enhanced individual. Moreover, soci-
ety may try to deny persons the right to enhance themselves or their 
children because of fears of inequality or cheating described in the 
previous section. Finally, we have limited an individual's ability to 
purchase certain medical products and services when we have felt 
that the individual could not adequately inform herself of the risks 
and benefits, at least not without an unrealistic amount of effort. 
Thus, we have delegated to the FDA the responsibility for reviewing 
the safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices and denied in-
dividuals the right to purchase unapproved products because the 
FDA, rather than the consumer, is deemed to possess the expertise, 
the access to data, and insulation from manufacturers' inducements 
and pressures needed to make this evaluation correctly.63 
The FDA example, however, suggests a slightly different way of 
thinking about the role of self-regulation in deciding whether or not 
to obtain genetic enhancement. What FDA regulation accomplishes, 
it might be said, is to carve out a realm-that of approved products 
and services-within which individuals are free to make their own 
choices. This realm is one in which competent individuals are 
deemed capable of being given sufficient information to enable them 
to make meaningful choices, and in which the effects of their choices 
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may 
as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact mini-
mal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason 
of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The other is to 
recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the pa-
tient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain 
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a cer-
tain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full 
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent .... "The instruc-
tion given should be modified to inform the jury that the physician has 
such discretion consistent, of course, with the full.disclosure of facts 
necessary to an informed consent." 
Natanson, 350 P.2d at 407 (quoting Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181). 
63. See BRODY, supra note 21, at 192-97. 
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on the welfare of third parties is deemed su1"ficiently small or ac-
ceptable. Within this realm, regulatory mechanisms, such as the 
FDA and health professionals, see their function primarily as one of 
providing data and advice to assist individuals in making their deci-
sions. 64 Particularly in view of the difficulty of objectively assessing 
the risks and benefits of genetic enhancement, we should strive to 
preserve as much individmll decision-making as is compatible with 
our concerns about competence, efficiency, and effects on others. 
This suggests, among other things, that we should attend to the 
need to make readily available to the public comprehensible infor-
mation about the risks and benefits of enhancement technologies. 
One other point needs to be made regarding self-regulation. In-
dividual choice can be influenced by social concerns. People act or 
refrain from acting on the basis of principle, and have been known 
to do so even at significant personal cost. Conceivably, individuals 
might eschew genetic enhancement for themselves or their offspring 
because of their belief in the principle of equality or because of the 
ethical problem raised by cheating. They might be encouraged to do 
so by political and religious leaders. If society felt that the threats 
from genetic enhancement outweighed the benefits, it would be 
likely to employ social pressures to affect individual decision-
making, a sort of "Just Say No" approach to genetic enhancement. 
Society might use this approach if other regulatory options were 
costly or not fully effective. As with the 'War on Drugs," self-
regulation may end up being one of the most important regulatory 
techniques. 
B. Professional Self-Regulation 
Genetic enhancement is unlikely to be available on a do-it-
yourself basis. Instead, it is likely to require the services of one or 
more health professionals. These include primary care physicians 
who are approached by their patients for information about, or re-
ferrals or prescriptions for, genetic enhancement; genetic counselors 
who explain options, risks, and benefits; infertility treatment spe-
cialists who provide the IVF services associated with germ cell en-
hancement; obstetricians and gynecologists who manage pregnan-
cies involving enhanced fetuses; and a new medical specialty likely 
to emerge with the advent of genetic enhancement: the genetic en-
hancement specialist.65 The involvement of these professionals 
opens up another regulatory avenue: relying on them to regulate 
themselves in providing access to enhancement services. 
Professional self-regulation may be based on individual ethical, 
religious, social, or scientific beliefs, or it may be based on the views 
of professional organizations such as the American Medical Associa-
64. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 393(b) (Law. Co-op. 1997) (describing FDA mission). 
65. Other health professionals may be involved as well, such as psychia-
trists, psychologists, social workers, and nurses. 
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tion ("P...MA") and the American College of Physicians; specialty 
groups like the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and 
the boards that govern specialty certification; prestigious organiza-
tions like the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sci-
ences; and views expressed in influential journals such as the New 
England Journal of Medicine or Science. In some cases, failure to 
adhere to the guidelines of professional associations can subject the 
health care professional to sanctions such as censure or loss of 
membership in the association.66 In other cases, the professional 
merely suffers the pangs of conscience. 
Professional self-regulation has played an important role in the 
regulation of genetic technologies. In 1974, scientists adopted a vol-
untary moratorium on research involving recombinant DNA tech-
nology until the potential risks were more clearly understood.67 
It is especially noteworthy that one professional association, the 
AMA, has already issued a policy statement to provide ethical guid-
ance to its members in dealing with genetic enhancement. This 
statement, put forward in 1994 by the AMA's Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, observes that efforts to enhance "desirable" charac-
teristics through the insertion of a modified or additional gene, or 
efforts to "improve" complex human traits-the eugenic develop-
ment of offspring-are contrary not only to the ethical tradition of 
medicine but also to the egalitarian values of our society.68 The 
statement goes on to assert that "genetic interventions to enhance 
traits should be considered permissible only in severely restricted 
66. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Rules XII-XIII (AMA Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs 1996-1997 ed.) (providing that the Council may expel a per-
son from membership in the association on grounds of ethical misconduct). Pro-
fessional sanctions differ from adverse actions taken by state medical boards for 
failure to adhere to state licensing laws and regulations, in that professional 
sanctions are imposed for breaches of rules adopted by the professionals them-
selves rather than by the government. For a discussion of government regula-
tion of genetic enhancement, see infra Section III.E-F. Note that the distinction 
between professional self-regulation and government regulation is not always 
clear, since government agencies in some cases delegate some of their regula-
tory oversight responsibilities to professional or industry self-regulatory bodies. 
A prime example is the Health Care Financing Administration's reliance on the 
Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to certify 
hospitals to be eligible to receive Medicare reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1395x(e)(9), 1395bb (Law. Co-op. 1999) (noting accredited hospitals deemed to 
meet Medicare certification requirements). 
67. See Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, SCIENCE, July 26, 1974, at 303 (1974). Apparently, the moratorium was 
universally adhered to until it was replaced by a regulatory review process 
within NIH in 1975. See generally Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits, 
Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Con-
troversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978) (outlining significant developments in 
the recombinant DNA debate from 1971-1977). 
68. Report on Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Screening, 3 ARCH 
FAM. MED. 633, 637-39 (1994). · 
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situations."69 
Without additional explanation, the Council lists three precon-
ditions: (1) "clear and meaningful benefit to the fetus or child,"70 (2) 
"no trade-off with other characteristics or traits,"71 and (3) "equal ac-
cess ... irrespective of income or other socioeconomic characteris-
tics.',n A physician who failed to comply with these conditions would 
be violating the code of ethics of her profession. 
The second of the Council's conditions is perplexing. What is 
meant by a "trade-off with other characteristics or traits"? Why 
should an individual not be permitted to accept, say, a slight reduc-
tion in dexterity for a significant increase in strength? Moreover, if 
health itself is regarded as a "characteristic," then the Council's 
statement, unwittingly perhaps, may call for a complete ban on ge-
netic enhancement, since as mentioned earlier, no physical interven-
tion in the human organism occurs without some chance of an ad-
verse effect on health or well-being, however slight the probability or 
trivial the effect. 
The Council's third condition responds to fairness concerns. It 
too is problematic. How is a physician or geneticist supposed to as-
sure equal access to genetic enhancements regardless of a patient's 
income (which bears on the patient's ability to pay)? Only if the 
government provided universal coverage of genetic enhancements 
for all who desired them would the Council's statement seem to 
permit physicians and other health care professionals to provide en-
hancement to anyone. · 
Yet the fact that the AMA Council addresses the fairness ques-
tion at all is highly significant. The services of health care profes-
sionals are likely to be indispensable to an individual seeking ge-
netic enhancement, because enhancement will entail manipulating 
DNA in vitro or in utero, or prescribing a drug or biologic. A con-
certed refusal by professionals to supply genetic enhancement un-
less certain social conditions were met could block or at least sub-
stantially reduce access to genetic enhancement. The technology 
would be available only from non-cooperating professionals on the 
black market, or in foreign countries whose professionals did not 
recognize similar self-limitations. 
It remains to be seen how successful professional self-regulation 
would be in solving the fairness and cheating problems. Genetic en-
hancement is certain to be lucrative. In an era of dwindling profes-
sional incomes, caused in part by the shift to managed care, physi-
cians and other health care providers may be unable to resist the 
economic incentives to provide genetic enhancements to those will-
69. Id. at 640. 
70. Id. The Council's statement focused on genetic interventions in chil-
dren and fetuses, and did not address self-enhancement by adults. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 641. 
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ing to pay for them.73 Not all professionals may agree with the 
egalitarian philosophy represented by the Council's statement. 
While the AMA, for example, has long endorsed the principle that 
physicians have a duty to provide health care services to the indi-
gent,74 the organization also supports the view that physicians 
should be permitted to charge Medicare patients any amount that 
the physician wishes, so long as the patient agrees not to seek Medi-
care reimbursement for any part of the fee,75 which would lift exist-
ing restrictions on physician charges and, in the view of some, would 
undermine the egalitarian features of the Medicare program.76 Re-
gardless of the position taken by medical organizations, individual 
doctors and other health care professionals may follow their own 
consciences. 
C. Restrictions on Research Funding 
The federal government currently finances a substantial portion 
of the research associated with the Human Genome Project, and is 
likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 77 A refusal by 
the government to fund research on genetic enhancement, or a re-
fusal to do so unless certain conditions were met, could significantly 
affect the development of these technologies. 
Historical precedent for this type of regulation is found in the 
activities of the NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 
("RAC"). 78 The RAC was formed in 1975 to review applications for 
73. See Internal Medicine's Identity Crisis, MED. EcoN., May 12, 1997, at 
110 (reporting the results of a survey by the American College of Physicians of 
417 members' views on managed care, with half reporting a decrease in in-
come). 
74. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.065 (AMA Council on Ethical and Ju-
dicial Affairs 1996-97 ed.). 
75. See Sean Martin, Private Contracting Heats Up: Right to Opt Out of 
Medicare at Issue in Lawsuit, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 19, 1998, at 23. · 
76. See Physician Contracting: Debate over KYL Amendment Grows, 
HEALTH LINE, Nov. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, RXMEGA 
File (explaining the position of the American College of Physicians). 
77. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Bad Blood in U.S. Genome Research, 351 
LANCET 1939, 1939-40 (1998). 
78. Other examples are the ban on funding of research using fetal tissue or 
embryos and the .proposed ban on human cloning. See infra notes 126-128 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed ban on funding human 
cloning. The first ban related to research using fetuses accompanied the estab-
lishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. See National Research Service Award Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 213, 88 Stat. 342, 392 (prohibiting research "on a 
living human fetus" that is not done "for the purpose of assuring the survival of 
such fetus"). The recommendations of the National Commission were codified 
in 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1998). 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 governs activities directed toward 
fetuses in utero, while 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 governs activities directed toward fe-
tuses ex utero. Both are geared towards allowing only research posing a mini-
mal risk to the fetus. Additionally, 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 provides for the estab-
lishment of Ethical Advisory Boards responsible for evaluating the merit of 
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NIH funding for experiments involving recombinant DNA technol-
ogy. Following the creation of the RAC, scientists lifted their volun-
tary moratorium on recombinant DNA experiments mentioned ee~.r­
lier.79 The RAC historically concerned itself chiefly with issues of 
safety and the protection of human research subjects, restricting the 
release of recombinant DNA-altered plants into the environment, 5° 
and limiting the conditions in which gene insertion could be at-
tempted on patients.81 The RAC also has addressed the conditions, 
if any, in which genetic enhancement experiments could be under-
taken, and the committee has been mindful of the fairness and 
individual research proposals that fall outside of 45 C.F.R. § 46. The creation of 
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research drained resources from the Ethical Advi-
sory Board, however, thus creating a de facto "moratorium on fetal research 
posing more than minimal risk, unless expected to enhance the health of the 
particular fetus." Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Cloning Human Beings: Do Re-
search Moratoria Work?, in 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETffiCS ADVISORY COMMISSION, at H8 
(1997). In 1985, Congress amended the Public Health Service Act, banning 
funding for "any research or experimentation ... on a nonviable living human 
fetus ex utero or a living human fetus ex utero for whom viability has not been 
ascertained" unless the research was geared towards increasing the survival 
prospects of the particular fetus or the research would not subject the fetus to 
increased risk of harm. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-158, 
99 Stat. 820, 877 (1985). The 1988 NIH authorization continued this morato-
rium. See Cook-Deegan, supra, at H9. Funding for experiments using fetal tis-
sue became a concem soon thereafter. Assistant Secretary of Health Robert 
Windom responded to an NIH request for authorization to support research into 
using fetal tissue to treat Parkinson's disease by imposing a funding morato-
rium pending consideration by an ad hoc panel of his questions. See Letter 
from Robert Windom to Dr. Wyngaarden, reprinted in REPORT OF THE HUMAN 
FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH PANEL (1988). In 1993, the National 
Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 removed the legislative morato-
rium on fetal research that had been in place since 1985. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 
107 Stat. 122, 129 (1993). This moratorium was restored in the NIH appropria-
tions bills for fiscal years 1996 through 1998. See Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-78, 111 Stat. 1467, 1517 (1998); Cook-Deegan, supra, at H10. For a discus-
sion of these moratoria, see generally Cook-Deegan, supra. 
79. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text. 
80. The RAC provides guidelines specifying physical and biological con-
tainment conditions and practices suitable to the greenhouse conduct of ex-
periments involving recombinant DNA-containing plants and plant-associated 
microorganisms. See generally Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant 
DNA, app. P (1999) (visited June 6, 1999) <http://www.nih.gov/od/ordal 
apndxp.htm>. 
81. NIH regulations required all proposals for federally funded research 
involving gene insertion into humans to be reviewed by the RAC. Germ lineal-
terations were prohibited. Somatic cell alterations were to be considered if 
their aim was to protect the health and well being of human subjects being 
treated at the same time that generalized knowledge was being gathered. See 
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA, supra note 80, at§ III-c-1, 
app. M. 
1999] REGULATING GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 697 
cheating concerns discussed above.82 The RAC therefore might be an 
important regulatory mechanism. However, its mission recently has 
been redefined and its authority to rule on whether or not the NIH 
should fund specific research applications largely has been trans-
ferred to the FDA.83 In order for the NIH to come to grips with the 
social policy issues raised by genetic enhancement, it either would 
have to restore the regulatory authority of the RAC or create a new 
entity with authority comparable to that which the RAC previously 
exercised. 
NIH funding restrictions only affect government-sponsored re-
search. Private companies are likely to sponsor genetic enhance-
ment experiments that would avoid NIH controls, especially if the 
government restricted its own research funding. However, the gov-
ernment does impose a set of requirements on research conducted at 
hospitals and other institutions that receive reimbursement under 
government entitlement programs such as Medicare. 84 These insti-
tutions are required to establish "institutional review boards" 
("IREs") to review research proposals to ensure the protection of 
human subjects and compliance with the requirements of informed 
consent.85 These controls apply not only to government-funded ex-
periments, but to research funded by private manufacturers.86 
Moreover, the FDA imposes a similar set of requirements on pri-
vately-funded research which is submitted to FDA in support of an 
application to approve the marketing of a product within the 
agency's regulatory jurisdiction. 87 
Despite this web of regulation, loopholes exist that could allow a 
significant degree of non-complying research to be conducted. His-
torically, government research requirements have tended to avoid 
fairness issues, except those that would affect the willingness of in-
dividuals to participate as human subjects.88 Even if the govern-
82. See id. 
83. See FDC, The Pink Sheet, Dec. 16, 1997, TRADE & Gov'T, at 17. For a 
discussion of FDA regulation of genetic enhancement, see infra Section III.E. 
84. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102, 46.103 (1998); see also Jesse A. Goldner, An 
Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Im-
plications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 63, 99 (1993) 
(explaining that federal regulations for research have been made applicable to 
all institutions doing research, including hospitals, universities, and medical 
schools, regardless of the source of funding). 
85. See 45 C.F.R. § 103(h). 
86. See id. at§ 46.103(b). 
87. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.103(a) (1998); see also Goldner, supra note 84, at 99 
(explaining that FDA requirements "mandate IRB review of all investigational 
studies designed to support applications to the FDA for the marketing of drugs 
and medical devices"). 
88. For example, rules issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services limit the incentives that researchers can offer members of certain 
populations, such as prisoners, to participate in biomedical experiments. See 45 
C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(2) (1998). 
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ment sought to regulate research for fairness reasons, its efforts 
would be limited under current law to research funded by the gov-
ernment, and to privately-funded research only to the extent that it 
accompanied an application for FDA marketing approval. As the 
discussion in Section E below explains, genetic enhancement is 
likely to emerge as an unapproved use of an approved drug or bio-
logic product, for which no marketing approval would be sought.89 
The government's current regulatory control over private research 
relating to such uses therefore is limited. Without substantial 
change in the law and the government's regulatory practices, re-
strictions on research in the name of social concerns such as fairness 
and cheating are likely to be incomplete and ineffective. 
D. Third-Party Payers 
As previously noted, access to specific medical technologies is 
controlled in substantial part by coverage policies established by 
government and private health insurers.9° Few Americans can af-
ford to purchase expensive health care services with personal funds. 
The fact that genetic enhancement would not be covered under 
third-party payment policies currently in effect is the major cause of 
the unfairness and cheating problems discussed earlier. 
The coverage practice of private third-party payers in regard to 
genetic enhancements is unlikely to change in the future in response 
to these social problems. Private insurers view their businesses as 
competitive enterprises motivated by the need to make a profit.91 
They are unlikely to provide third-party payment for genetic en-
hancement if their competitors do not. Plans that covered genetic 
enhancement would have to charge higher premiums, a problem ex-
acerbated by the likelihood of "adverse selection," the phenomenon 
in which individuals who know in advance that they will demand 
particular covered services will migrate to those plfuJ.S that cover 
them, driving up premiums.92 Similarly, third-party payers are not 
likely to be willing voluntarily to expend significant resources to po-
lice the behavior of providers and enrollees that does not affect the 
payers' costs; expecting payers on their own initiative. to enforce ge-
netic enhancement prohibitions or restrictions for purposes of 
achieving social goals is unrealistic unless the payers are forced to 
do so by law. Even if state or federal legislation attempted to im-
pose such obligations on private third-party payers,93 its reach would 
89. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
91. Even not-for-profit insurers such as some Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans 
must operate in the black and, therefore, must compete effectively against for-
profit plans. 
92. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alter-
native Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 
28-29 (1991). 
93. Under current law, state regulation of private health insurers is limited 
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not extend to persons who purchased genetic enhancement with 
their own funds. 
In contrast to private insurers, government third-party payer 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid might be expected to be 
more ·sensitive to social concerns. An example is the End Stage Re-
nal Disease Program under Medicare, which covers kidney dialysis 
for all persons even though they are under age sixty-five or other-
wise ineligible for Medicare. 94 Congress established this program in 
1972 in response to concerns that poor people and others were dying 
because they could not afford kidney dialysis. 
As noted earlier, however, the cost of providing universal access 
to genetic enhancement would be prohibitive.95 Expecting a program 
like Medicare or Medicaid to cover enhancement is therefore unre-
alistic. Yet these programs might be employed as regulatory han-
dles to control the behavior of health care providers. For example, 
the federal government imposes a number of requirements andre-
strictions on hospitals and health care professionals on pain of being 
disqualified from receiving Medicare reimbursement. Some of these 
regulations, such as the requirement that a hospital emergency 
room stabilize patients in emergency conditions or in active labor be-
fore transferring them, apply to all patients, not just to Medicare 
beneficiaries.96 Similarly, the federal government might impose re-
strictions on access to genetic enhancement by threateriing to dis-
qualifY non-compliant providers from participating in the Medicare 
program. This use of federal authority resembles the outright 
criminalization of genetic enhancement, which will be discussed 
later. 
E. FDA Regulation 
One of the more obvious sources of government regulation of 
genetic enhancement is regulation by the Food and Drug Admini-
stration. The FDA licenses the marketing of drugs, biological prod-
ucts and medical devices, all of which may be involved in the deliv-
ery of enhancement serVices. Moreover, the FDA regulates research 
on these products when the research is submitted in support of a li-
censing application or an approved product. As noted in Section C, 
by the provisions of ERISA, which exempt employer self-insured health plans 
from state insurance regulation. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 
1999) (establishing the so-called "deemer clause"). Unless the ERISA preemp-
tion provisions were repealed, legislative control of payer policies toward ge-
netic enhancement would have to be enacted by Congress. For a discussion of 
potential legislative controls on access to genetic enhancement, see infra text 
accompanying notes 126-28. · 
94. See Richard A Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for 
Victims of End-Stage Renal Disease, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autuinn 1976, at 
196, 198-201. 
95. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1997). 
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the FDA now asserts authority previously held by the RAC to regu-
late research on genetic technologies.97 
To the extent that these genetic technologies are aimed at im-
proving the appearance of the body, they might seem to be cosmet-
ics, which the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines as "ar-
ticles intended to be ... introduced into, or otherwise applied to the 
human body or any part thereof for ... cleansing, beautifying, pro-
moting attractiveness, or altering the appearance .... "98 But the 
FDA exerts little regulatory effort on cosmetics. Unlike drugs or 
medical devices, they do not have to be approved prior to being mar-
keted, and generally are subjected to FDA scrutiny only if they pres-
ent a safety risk.99 In order for the FDA to be able to control the in-
troduction and use of genetic enhancement technologies, these 
techniques would have to be considered to be drugs, biologics, or 
medical devices. 
The FDA possesses ample authority to regulate genetic en-
hancements within these categories, however. In regard to drugs 
used for enhancement purposes, the definition of a drug in the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act includes not only "articles in-
tended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of disease in man" but "articles (other than food) intended to 
affect the structure or function of the body of man."100 The FDA has 
relied on this definition to assert drug regulatory authority over 
products such as wrinkle creams and tanning agents that are in-
tended to enhance the appearance of the body but that achieve their 
results by affecting the body's structural or functional components. 101 
The Act similarly defines a medical device to include "an instru-
ment, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article ... which is ... intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man."102 
97. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
98. 21 U.S.C.S. § 321(i) (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
99. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 361 (Law. Co-op. 1993). 
100. 21 U.S.C.S. § 321(g)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1998). 
101. See United States v. Line Away, 284 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Del. 1968) 
(holding that wrinkle creams are drugs); 43 Fed. Reg. 38,206 (1978) (codifYing 
tanning agents as drugs). 
102. 21 U.S.C.S. §321(h). The definition distinguishes a medical device from 
a drug in that a device "does not achieve its primary intended purposes through 
chemical action within or on the body of man ... and which is not dependent on 
being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes." Id. 
Interestingly, the FDA presently regulates gene therapy products through its 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER"), regarding them as "bi-
ologics." See FDA Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,249 (1993). The FDA has ju-
risdiction over biologics under the Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1944, 42 
U.S.C.S. § 262 (Law. Co-op. 1999). However, the definition of a "biologic" is a 
"virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous product applicable to 
the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man." 21 C.F.R. § 
600.3(h) (1998) (emphasis added). Therefore, the FDA would not have jurisdic-
tion over an enhancement under this definition. Nevertheless, the FDA has 
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Nevertheless, FDA regulation of genetic enhancement is likely 
to be inadequate to address the efficacy and safety concerns de-
scribed earlier. In the first place, the scope of FDA review is statu-
torily limited to safety and efficacy.103 It currently does not have any 
statutory authority to consider the threat to personal autonomy 
posed by parental decisions to genetically enhance children, much 
less the social problems of fairness or cheating. To understand how 
limited the FDA's authority is, consider that the agency does not 
even have the authority to take into account the relative need for or 
cost of the products it regulates. For example, the agency could not 
decline to approve a product because there was another product al-
ready on the market that was equally safe and effective, even if the 
product already being marketed was less expensive.104 
Even if the FDA were to assert the authority to consider the so-
cial implications of genetic enhancement, or to be given that 
authority by congressional amendment of its enabling legislation, 
the agency currently has no experience or expertise in this realm. It 
would be necessary to hire additional staff or to rely on panels of 
outside experts. There is precedent for the latter in the form of the 
agency's advisory committees/05 but these committees provide ex-
pert advice to the agency on safety and efficacy matters within the 
agency's general expertise. The agency has no track record for em-
ploying outside experts to advise the agency on matters such as so-
cial fairness. 
Moreover, even the FDA's ability to regulate genetic enhance-
ments in the traditional areas of safety and efficacy would be com-
promised by the data deficiencies and subjectivity of judgments 
about risk and benefit described above. The example of liposuction 
devices for weight reduction mentioned earlier, where the benefit is 
purely cosmetic, illustrates the agency's difficulties: how can the 
government conclude that a risk of complications so clearly out-
weighs the subjective value to patients of an improvement in ap-
pearance that a liposuction device, assuming that it actually does 
remove fatty deposits, should not be approved because it is unsafe or 
ineffective? 
taken the position that CBER can regulate drugs and devices as well as biol-
ogics in appropriate circumstances. See 21 C.F.R. § 5.33(a) (1998). Since an 
enhancement fits the definition of a drug or device even though it is not in-
tended for therapeutic purposes, the allocation of regulatory authority to CBER 
is permissible. 
103. See John Geweke & Burton A. Weisbrod, Clinical Evaluation us. Eco-
nomic Evaluation: The Case of a New Drug, 20 MED. CARE 821, 821 (1982). 
104. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, COST BENEFIT AND COST EFFECTIVENESS 
. ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE PRINCIPLES AND POTENTIAL 198 (1982); Geweke & 
Weisbrod, supra note 103, at 821. 
105. These are governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.S. 
app. 2, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1998), and by FDA regulations.· See 21 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-
14.174 (1998). 
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The FDA's problems with regulating enhancement-type tech-
nologies are also illustrated by its position in regard to cosmetic con-
tact lenses and breast implants. In the latter case, the agency ap-
pears to have taken the view that the benefits from cosmetic use are 
outweighed by the risks, but not the benefits from therapeutic use. 
Thus, when the safety controversy over silicone gel-filled breast im-
plants erupted in 1992, the agency limited their use to research for 
reconstruCtive purposes: i.e., in women who have had breast cancer 
surgery, severe injury to the breast, a birth defect affecting the 
breast, or a medical condition causing a severe breast abnormality. 106 
The implants could not be used, much less studied, for cosmetic 
breast augmentation. At the same time, however, the FDA makes 
no distinction between cosmetic and reconstructive uses for saline 
breast implants: both are permitted. 107 This signifies either that the 
agency feels that the risks posed by saline implants are so small 
that they are outweighed by cosmetic as well as by therapeutic bene-
fits, or that the agency simply has not come to grips with the en-
hancement/therapy distinction. 
The possibility that the FDA lacks a clear appreciation of the 
enhancement/therapeutic distinction is reinforced by the agency's 
position on contact lenses. As with saline breast implants, the 
agency makes no regulatory distinction between contact lenses for 
corrective versus cosmetic use. 108 A manufacturer can market non-
prescription lenses that change eye color under the same conditions 
as corrective lenses, despite the argument that, given the risks from 
contact lens use, the ratio of risks to benefits ought to be more fa-
vorable to justify the use of lenses for purely cosmetic purposes. 
Finally, even if the FDA did establish a clear policy in regard to 
evaluating the relative safety of genetic enhancement, the agency 
would find itself virtually unable to enforce it. This stems primarily 
from the expectation that, as noted earlier, genetic enhancements 
may emerge as unapproved or off-label uses of approved products, 
uses over which the FDA lacks effective regulatory control. The 
agency might attempt to regulate off-label uses of genetic technolo-
gies by asserting jurisdiction over physician prescribing practices, 109 
but the medical profession would be likely to view this as an unwar-
ranted intrusion into their exercise of professional discretion. The 
other option would be for the FDA to prohibit or restrict the mar-
106. See FDC, The Gray Sheet, June 22, 1992, at 11. 
107. See FDC, The Gray Sheet, May 9, 1994, at 17-19. 
108. See Letter from Muriel Gelles to Maxwell Mehlman (July 13, 1998) (on 
file with author). 
109. The agency would most likely need additional authority from Congress 
to do so. FDA regulations require prescriptions for controlled substances to be 
issued "for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in 
the usual course of his professional practice." 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (1998). For 
the FDA to apply this regulatory requirement to genetic enhancements, how-
ever, they would first have to be classified as controlled substances. 
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keting of genetic technologies for therapeutic purposes because of 
fears about their enhancement uses. But it is completely unrealistic 
to expect society to forego therapeutic benefits in order to reduce 
enhancement risks. Imagine the reaction if the FDA sought to en-
join the marketing of a drug that alleviated the cognitive effects of 
mental retardation merely because it might be used by "normals" to 
"unfairly'' boost their intelligence. 
An additional set of constraints on the effectiveness of FDA 
regulation of genetic enhancements lies in the territorial limitations 
on the agency's jurisdiction. In the first place, under the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution, the agency lacks jurisdic-
tion over purely intra-state marketing. 110 But given the broad inter-
pretation that the courts have given to interstate commerce, coupled 
with the likelihood that some elements of a genetic enhancement 
technology will cross state lines,111 this is not likely to be a serious 
impediment. More significant by far will be the FDA's lack of juris-
diction over foreign providers.112 A person seeking a genetic en-
hancement that the FDA restricted in the United States could sim-
ply travel to another country where the technology was freely 
available. The FDA might attempt to interdict the importation of an 
enhancement back into the United States,113 but would be hard 
pressed to do so from a practical standpoint if the enhancement al-
ready had been introduced into the recipient's body, either as a 
drug, a drug factory, or an inserted gene.114 
110. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.S. § 355 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (establishing FDA regu-
lation of new drugs in interstate commerce). For an activity to be considered 
. purely intrastate, it could not, either alone or in combination with other activi-
ties, have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce or on movement 
in interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) 
(possessing firearms in a school zone is not an economic activity that might 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). But see, e.g., Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (holding that farmer's production of wheat for 
home consumption could be federally regulated because the cumulative effect of 
multiple instances of people doing so could be felt in interstate commerce). 
111. These could be the consumers or providers as well as components of 
drugs, biologics, or devices used in the delivery of enhancement services. 
112. See generally Julie C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS 
Drugs: An International Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229 (1995) (comparing the 
FDA drug regulation system to other nations' approaches). . . 
113. The Bureau of Customs enforces FDA restrictions by intercepting un-
approved drugs and devices at the borders. This policy has proved controversial 
in the case of drugs to treat AIDS, which have been brought into the US from 
abroad and sometimes re-sold through so-called "AIDS clubs." See Jon S. Bat-
terman, Note, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the Experimental Drug 
Distribution Standards Be Modified in Response to the Needs of Persons with 
AIDS?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 191, 193-94 (1990). 
114. An argument might be made that the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against search and seizure prohibits such intrusiveness, although the courts 
have supported intrusive searches given a reasonable suspicion of an unlawful 
act. See, e.g., United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(holding strip searches authorized). 
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F. Drug Enforcement Administration 
At first, the notion of regulating genetic enhancements using 
the authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA'') un-
der the Controlled Substances Act may sound peculiar, but it might 
be appropriate on a number of grounds. The Controlled Substances 
Act is the primary- mechanism for regulating drugs that pose a 
threat to society by their use. 115 The Act creates a system of "sched-
ules" that categorize these products on the basis of comparing their 
therapeutic value with their potential for abuse.116 A similar ap-
proach might distinguish enhancement and therapeutic uses of ge-
netic technologies. The DEA also has extensive experience with a 
wide range of practical techniques for restricting access to such 
products. 
Relying on a police regime under a scheme like the Controlled 
Substances Act to regulate genetic enhancement, however, raises 
the chilling specter of a government-led "war on genes." Given the 
intimate contexts in which individuals would obtain genetic en-
hancements-the realms of reproductive behavior and the patient-
physician relationship-the intrusiveness of such a program would 
be suspect and possibly unconstitutional.117 The success to date in 
the War on Drugs is not an encouraging omen for a war on genes. 118 
All of the difficulties that have marked that endeavor would be pre-
sent here: the invasions of privacy, the creation of black markets, 119 
115. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 801(6) (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
116. See id. § 811. Substances are scheduled as follows: Schedule I: high po-
tential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use, lack of accepted safety for 
use under medical supervision; Schedule II: high potential for abuse, has a cur-
rently accepted medical use, abuse may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence; Schedule III: less potential for abuse than Schedule I and II sub-
stances, has a currently accepted medical use, abuse may lead to moderate or 
low physical or high psychological dependence; Schedule IV: low potential for 
abuse compared to Schedule III substances, has a currently accepted medical 
use, abuse may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence compared 
to Schedule III; Schedule V: low potential for abuse compared to Schedule IV, 
has a currently accepted medical use, may lead to limited physical or psycho-
logical dependence compared to Schedule IV. See id. § 812. 
117. The constitutionality of a "war on genes" would be judged by the nature 
of the public and private interests at stake and the degree of intrusiveness of 
the government's actions. If the government could offer a compelling justifica-
tion for why its actions were necessary to protect the public health and welfare, 
the courts would be likely to uphold severe regulatory restraints. Similar chal-
lenges have failed, for example, in the case of government restrictions on the 
use of illegal drugs and on sexual behavior that presents a threat to public 
health. See, e.g., Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990) (rejecting first amendment religious challenge to drug law); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy statute). 
118. See generally Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America?, 1991 
STAN L. & PoL 'y REV. 242 (examining tl;le costs and benefits of the drug war, 
concluding that legalization is the best alternative). 
119. A historical analogy would be the availability of illegal abortions prior 
to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Zad Leavy & Jerome Kummer, 
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and the inability to seal the borders against the importation of con-
traband or its purchase abroad.120 Yet thinking about a drug-
enforcement approach to genetic enhancement is an important re-
minder of the consequences of a highly restrictive attitude toward 
access to these technologies. If, as some have suggested, we become 
determined to "ban" genetic enhancement, and to enforce such a 
prohibition vigorously, it is the model of the War on Drugs that we 
will be embracing. 
G. Controlling Health Care Professionals Under State or Federal 
Law 
In contrast to professional self-regulation, in which health care 
professionals regulate their behavior through internalized or profes-
sionally established norms, regulation of genetic enhancement could 
be handled under state laws that control professional behavior. 
Chief among these are state licensure laws, the common and statu-
tory laws that govern medical malpractice actions, and general 
criminal provisions. For example, a state could revoke a physician's 
license to practice medicine for providing genetic enhancements or a 
cause of action could be recognized for improper use of enhancement 
technology. A malpractice action would lie, for example, if a patient 
suffered adverse physical or emotional effects from an enhancement 
and could show that the enhancement had been provided in an im-
proper manner (for example, the physician erred unreasonably in 
the dosage of an enhancement product or in the genetic manipula-
tion of the patient's DNA) or that the physician had failed to obtain 
the patient's informed consent to the procedure.121 Finally, the state 
or federal government could criminalize genetic enhancement. 
Criminal penalties could be imposed on those who received en-
hancement, but a more likely approach would be to sanction the 
providers. 
Given the uncertainty and experimental nature of genetic en-
hancement, malpractice actions are not likely to be a useful regula-
Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 
123 (1962) (suggesting that one out of two pregnancies terminate in illegal 
abortion). 
120. For a complete discussion of these difficulties, see MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, 
supra note 46, at 112-21. 
121. See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin & Maxwell J. Mehlman, Wrongful Birth: 
Medical, Legal, and Philosophical Issues, 22 J. LAW MED. & ETIDCS 21 (1994). 
An action also might be brought by or on behalf of a child who complained that 
a physician enhanced her without her consent, but, given the presumed benefits 
from enhancement, such a suit would be likely to fail on the ground that the 
child was better off as the result of the physician's actions. An analogy would 
be "wrongful life" actions-suits brought by children claiming that but for the 
malpractice, the child would not have been born-which the courts generally 
dismiss. See, e.g., Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that 
a child born with severe birth defect could not maintain a tort action against 
physician). 
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tory tool. There is likely to be little in the way of a standard of care 
for providing genetic enhancement, at least not when the technology 
is first being introduced. So long as the health care professional 
followed the steps required when providing a patient with an ex-
perimental treatment, including carefully informing the patient of 
the inherent uncertainties, the professional is likely to be pro-
tected.122 Moreover, malpractice actions are expensive and, some 
have argued, highly inefficient techniques for regulating physician 
behavior.123 Most importantly, the professional standard of care may 
have trouble incorporating social concerns such as fairness and 
cheating. Although, in theory, the standard of care in medical mal-
practice cases, as in all of tort law, is based on an assessment and 
comparison of risks and benefits,124 judges and juries may find it dif-
ficult to sanction a physician for acting in her patient's best interest 
even when doing so creates a. threat of social unfairness. Indeed, it 
may be deemed to be inappropriate for a physician to compromise 
the care of a patient in order to achieve a societal distributive goal. 
For example, a physician might be liable for denying a patient a 
benefit in order to conserve resources for others. For this reason, 
the Oregon state legislature immunizes physicians from civil liabil-
ity when they deny Medicaid benefits to patients in reliance on the 
state's Medicaid rationing program; otherwise, physicians might be 
liable for malpractice for acting in a way that fell below the standard 
of care in a particular patient's case. 125 
In order to embed concerns about social justice within the pro-
fessional standard of care so that physicians might be sanctioned ei-
ther under licensure laws or tort actions, it would be necessary for a 
122. The Department of Health, Education & Welfare, through the NIH, de-
veloped three guidelines for human experimentation: (1) protection of rights 
and welfare of subjects, (2) informed consent requirement, and (3) assessment of 
risks and potential benefits by a review panel. See Karine Morin, The Standard 
of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 174 
(1998). 
123. See COMMI'ITEE TO STUDY MED. PROF'L LIAB. & THE DELIVERY OF 
OBSTETRICAL CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 1 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 54-72 (1989); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL 
LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 44 (1987); Harvard Medical Practice Study, Pa-
tients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation and Pa-
tient Compensation in New York 8-75 (1990); Paul Weiler et al., Proposal for 
Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355, 2355 (1992). But see Maxwell J. 
Mehlman, Bad "Bad Baby" Bills, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 129, 136 (1994) (arguing 
that current system protects most severely injured malpractice victims). 
124. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
125. See Maxwell Mehlman, The Oregon Medicaid Program: Is It Just?, 1 
HEALTH MATRIX 175, 175-76 (1991). An exception would be where the patient 
needed an organ transplant. There, because of the shortage of transplant or-
gans, the physician might be justified in denying a transplant to one patient in 
order to maximize the benefit from the organ by giving it to another. 
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legislature to enact a specific prohibition into law. A legislative ini-
tiative also would be needed to criminalize research on or the provi-
sion of enhancement services, since there are no existing criminal 
laws that would achieve this result. 
A similar approach is being considered in the case of prohibiting 
human cloning.126 Apart from the wisdom of such a goal, questions 
are being raised about the appropriateness of a legislature in effect 
trying to "stop science."127 Critics of a cloning ban argue, for exam-
ple, that it would have unwanted effects.128 Due to the difficulty of 
defining objectionable cloning practices, legislation would be over-
broad, inhibiting therapeutic advances that depended on cloning 
techniques. Similar problems in distinguishing between therapeutic 
and enhancement uses of genetic technologies, described earlier, 
would beset legislative efforts to ban genetic enhancement.129 
1. Leveling the Playing Field 
The final approach to coping with the societal threats posed by 
genetic enhancement realistically assumes that it will be impossible 
to prevent some individuals from enhancing themselves or their 
children. Even draconian regulatory efforts like a legislative ban or 
a drug-war-like interdiction program would have only limited suc-
cess. The question then is: are there means by which society car1 re-
126. For legislation to outlaw the use of somatic cells in the production of 
human clones, see, e.g., H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1599, 105th Cong. 
(1997); S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1997). For legislation to prohibit the cloning of 
humans, see, e.g., S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S.B. 8, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
1998); S.B. 68, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); S.B. 1344, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
1997); S.B. 1243, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (lll. 1997); A.B. 9116, 221st Leg., 
1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998); S.B. 5993, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998); 
H.B. 675, 122d Leg., 1997-98 Reg.Sess. (Ohio 1997); S.B. 218, 122d Leg., 1997-
98 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997). For legislation to prohibit attempts to clone through 
somatic cell nuclear transfer and the use of Federal funds for such purpose, see, 
e.g., S. 1602, 105th Cong. (1998); H.B. 2235, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (ill. 
1997); A.B. 9183, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998). For legislation to 
prohibit research using cloned cells or tissues, see A.B. 1251, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 1997); H.B. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997). 
127. See Charles Krauthammer,A Special Report on Cloning, TIME, Mar. 10, 
1997, at 60 (stating that "[n)o amount of regulation by the FDA or the NIH or 
even the FBI will stop ... [human cloning]"). 
128. California's attempt to ban human cloning is "so sloppily worded that it 
prohibits a host of infertility treatments." Confronting Cloning, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 1998, Metro Section, at 7. See also John A. Robertson, Human Cloning: 
Should the United States Legislate Against It?, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 81 (dis-
cussing briefly the merits of human cloning); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Iden-
tity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1371, 1376-82 (1998) (discussing the 
potential benefits of cloning); John A. Robertson, The Question of Human Clon-
ing, HAsTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 6 ("If we ban the immediate steps 
in order to prevent potentially harmful future applications, infertile couples lose 
the benefits of the procedure without a clear showing that future harms would 
necessarily have occurred."). 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
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duce the harmful social effects that were described earlier? 
A full-scale discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, it is interesting to consider how society has dealt 
with similar issues in the past. How has society responded to the 
fact that some people have superior attributes compared with oth-
ers, attributes that they have developed, inherited, or come upon by 
chance, and that give them significant advantages? 
Curiously, very little has been written about this subject. The 
literature has focused on society's response to those who are disad-
vantaged relative to the norm-persons with disabilities, or those 
who are poor or poorly educated-rather than on those whose at-
tributes are "superior." Yet if one identifies these advantageous 
traits (such as beauty, size, strength, endurance, intelligence, mem-
ory, creativity, knowledge, charm, confidence, energy, experience, 
reputation, pedigree, socioeconomic status, wealth, and social or po-
litical power) and examines society's response to their potential im-
pact in interactions with the unadvantaged, some interesting in-
sights emerge. 
In some cases, we ignore the advantages that some people pos-
sess. For example, we do not weight performance on college admis-
sions tests according to the IQ of the test taker. Nor do we have 
basketball leagues restricted to players of "normal" height. In other 
instances, however, we prohibit people from taking advantage of 
their superiority. For example, securities trading by people who 
have "inside information" is illegal.130 The use of performance-
enhancing drugs in many sporting competitions, such as the Olym-
pics, is against the rules. 131 Boxing, but not wrestling, creates com-
130. Although Congress has addressed the issue of insider trading through 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984), there is no statutory definition of in-
sider trading. The courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") 
have primarily based the prohibition on insider trading on SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998), which prohibits employment of manipulative and de-
ceptive devices. See In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (stating that 
"[i]ntimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited"). The scope of 
the prohibition was circumscribed in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
233 (1980) (holding that an individual possessing information not available to 
the public, but who is not a corporate insider, does not violate the prohibition on 
insider trading in the absence of a relationship between the individual and the 
seller that gives rise to a special duty). In United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 643 (1997), however, the Court reaffirmed that a person violates the in-
sider trading prohibition "when he misappropriates confidential information for 
securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of 
the information .... " Additionally, SEC Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 
(1998), prohibits insider trading in the context of tender offers. For a discussion 
of an alternative source of a definition of insider trading, see Steve Thel, Statu-
tory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VA.ND. L. REV. 1091, 1097-
1100 (1997). 
131. See United States Olympic Committee, Drug Control Education (visited 
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petitive categories based on body weight; featherweigh~re not 
made to box against heavyweights. 
In still other cases, we permit persons with superior positions to 
engage in transactions involving the interests of the unadavantaged, 
but reserve to the unadvantaged the right to undo the transaction if 
the results seem too unfair. Contract law embodies this principle in 
the doctrine of unconscionability.132 Fiduciary law gives this power 
to beneficiaries when trustees transact business with trust assets.133 
Yet another approach is to adjust the position of the parties to a 
transaction to mitigate the effect of superiority. One example is 
making a person with superior information disclose the information 
to the other party, such as when sellers of real estate are required to 
June 6, 1999) <http://www.test.olympic-usa.org/inside/in 1 3 7 l.html> (de-
scribing various drugs that are prohibited by the United States Olympic Com-
Inittee including those that enhance performance such as stimulants and ana-
bolic agents). 
132. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that a contract may be unconscionable if there is "an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."); Jones v. 
Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (mem.) (hold-
ing unconscionable a defendant's sale of a $300.00 freezer for $1234.80, includ-
ing credit charges, to the plaintiffs, who were welfare recipients); Brooklyn Un-
ion Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975) (holding as 
unconscionable a contract written in English only and entered into by the de-
fendant, who spoke and read only Spanish, without the plaintiffs representa-
tive explaining the terms to him). Having found a contract to be unconscion-
able, the court may protect the disadvantaged individual by refusing to enforce 
the contract, enforcing the contract without the unconscionable clause, or lim-
iting the application of the unconscionable clause so the result is not uncon-
scionable. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1998). 
133. See AUSTINW. SCOTT & WILLIAM FRATCHER, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 2.5, 
at 43 (4th ed. 1987) ("If the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the benefi-
ciary and fails to make a full disclosure of all circumstances known to him af-
fecting the transaction, or if the transaction is unfair to the beneficiary, it can be 
set aside by him.") (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Scott stated: "Where he deals 
directly with the beneficiaries, the transaction may stand, but only if the trus-
tee makes full disclosure and takes no advantage of his position and the trans-
action is in all respects fair and reasonable." AUSTIN W. ScoTT, 2 THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 170.25, at 1387 (3d ed. 1967). Scott also stated: "In the case of a pur-
chase by a trustee of the trust property with the consent of the beneficiaries, 
however, it would seem that if the price is not fair the transaction can be set 
aside even though the trustee made full disclosure." Id. § 496, at 3536; see also 
Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate 
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 760 (1978). Anderson noted: 
Where bargaining power is roughly equal, specific fiduciary duties can 
be waived by the parties on the basis of full disclosure to and consent 
by the client. Because informational disparities so often mean that 
bargaining power is unequal, however, all fiduciaries have an unwai-
vable obligation offairness toward the other party. 
ld. For a discussion of these principles, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary 
Contracting Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Pro-
viders, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365 (1991). 
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disclose known defects in the property that the buyer would be hard 
pressed to discover without unreasonable effort or expense.134 An-
other type of adjustment is to handicap the person with superior at-
tributes. Weights are placed in the saddles of lighter jockeys.135 
Strokes are added to the scores of better golfers.136 Finally, the 
arms-length nature of a transaction can be eliminated, so that the 
superior party is forced to ''look out for" the interests of the weaker 
party. Fiduciary rules do this in the case of relationships between 
parties with disparate power, such as patients and physicians, at-
torneys and clients, parents and children. 137 Another example is 
suitability rules in securities offerings, in which the seller must 
make sure that the buyer possesses sufficient assets that he can af-
ford to lose his investment.138 
134. See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 107-08 (Wis. 1979) 
(stating that vendor had duty to disclose existence of underground well on resi-
dentiallot); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 161(b) (1979). 
135. See DIAGRAM GROUP, RULES OF THE GAME 258 (1974) (noting that 
"weights are adjusted to try to give horses an equal chance of winning"). 
136. See Blalmey Boggs, Your Game Handicaps Help Promote Equal Compe-
tition, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Aug. 13, 1998, at D13 (explaining that a 
handicap "is a way to level out the playing field between golfers of different 
abilities"); see also Greg Wilcox, See Blue, Tee from the White; Forward Tees 
Mean More Iron, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 6, 1998, at 88 (describing how players 
are grouped according to their handicaps so that they can compete against golf-
ers of similar skill). 
137. See generally Dyntel Corp. v. Ebner, 120 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that an attorney owes a client a fiduciary duty which comprises meet-
ing the standard of care); Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 
(5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and 
a client); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 
1987) (recognizing the fiduciary duty of an attorney to class plaintiffs in class 
action suit); Pharmacare v. Caremark, 965 F. Supp. 1411, 1419 (D. Haw. 1996) 
(recognizing fraud violates the fiduciary duty a doctor owes a patient); In re 
Marriage of Honkomp, 381 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding child 
support for minor children received by custodial parent in a fiduciary capacity 
cannot be used to set off individual debts); Ohio Cas. Ins. Corp. v. Mallison, 354 
P.2d 800, 802 (Or. 1960) (holding parents owe children a fiduciary duty when 
entering into a settlement on their behalf); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 
146 (Pa. Super Ct. 1962) (explaining the medical profession stands in a confi-
dential and fiduciary capacity to their patient such that they owe a duty of total 
care); Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919, 923 (Wash. 1979) (recognizing that a phy-
sician has a fiduciary duty to inform a patient about material facts concerning 
the patient's body so the patient can make an informed decision). 
138. National Association of Securities Dealers Conduct Rule 2310, in rele-
vant part, provides: 
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of 
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing 
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis 
of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security 
holdings and his financial situation and needs. (b) Prior to the execu-
tion of a transaction recommended to a non-institutional customer ... 
a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain information con-
cerning: (1) the customer's financial status; (2) the customer's tax 
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The question is whether these techniques would be effective to 
level the playing field in the case of genetic enhancements. Could 
genetically enhanced people be prohibited from taking advantage of 
their superior abilities to the disadvantage of "normals"? Could they 
be handicapped? Should they be made into fiduciaries for the less 
fortunate, a sort of genetic noblesse oblige? 
The answers to these questions depend on several considera-
tions. A key factor is how easy it will be to identifY the fact that 
someone is enhanced. The importance of this factor is demonstrated 
by the difficulties that detection problems create for efforts to pro-
hibit the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports.139 Another 
crucial consideration is the ratio of societal to personal benefit from 
allowing an individual to benefit from the enhancements. In sports 
competitions, for example, it is hard to discern any societal benefit 
from permitting athletes to use performance-enhancing drugs. But 
it may be sufficiently advantageous to society for enhanced indi-
viduals to be involved in scientific research that they will be permit-
ted to compete on an equal basis with unenhanced persons for scarce 
research positions or grants. 
An example of this is found in the law of torts. In general, peo-
ple are held to the standard of a "reasonable person" under like cir-
cumstances.140 A failure to behave like a reasonable person, which 
causes injury to another, subjects the actor to tort liability. This 
standard is modified, however, in the case of an actor who is physi-
cally (but not mentally) disabled. 141 We hold a blind person to the 
standard of a reasonable blind person. If we wanted to impose a 
status; (3) the customer's investment objectives; and (4) such other in-
formation used or considered to be reasonable by such member ... in 
making recommendations to the customer. 
National Ass'n of Securites Dealers, NASD Manual & Notices to Members (vis-
ited June 15, 1999) <http://www.nasdr.com/wbs/NETbos.dll?RefShow? 
ref=NASD4;&xinfo= . .lwebbos/goodbye.htm>; see also Gerald F. Rath & David C. 
Boch, Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies, SC73 ALI-ABA 191 (1998) 
(summarizing developments in broker and consumer litigation). The dealer 
must fulfill the obligation he assumes when he undertakes to counsel a cus-
tomer; this rule is not limited to situations where comprehensive financial in-
formation about the customer is known to the dealer. See, e.g., Erdos v. SEC, 
742 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a dealer has "a duty to act with 
caution and to malce recommendations based on the concrete information that 
he did have rather than on his speculation .... " about a customer's situation); 
In re Gerald M. Greenberg Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 
(1960) (expelling member of National Association of Securities Dealers); In re 
Phillips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956) (suspending over-speculative broker). 
139. See, e.g., Mark Zeigler, Illegal Doping is Everywhere Now, and the Cul-
prits are Rarely Caught, S.D. UNION TRIB., Aug. 17, 1997, at C1 (stating that 
performance enhancing drugs are "seeping through the sports world like an in-
jectable steroid is absorbed into the blood stream," and the only people who are 
caught are either "poor or stupid"). 
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). 
141. See id. § 283C. 
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duty on enhanced individuals to employ their superior traits to 
avoid accidents, we would not hold them to the standard of a rea-
sonable person, but to the standard of a reasonable enhanced per-
son. Thus, a driver whose vision had been enhanced to better than 
20/20 would not be held to the standard of a reasonable, unadvan-
taged individual, but to the standard of a reasonable person with 
superior vision. If they should have spotted the child running across 
the road in time to stop the car, even though a person with normal 
vision would not have seen the child, then, under an enhanced per-
son's standard, they could be liable for failing to stop in time. The 
enhanced person would be treated much the same way that profes-
sionals are treated, that is, held to a higher standard of care than 
non-professionals. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts appears to take this ap-
proach. In section 289, it states "[t]he actor is required to recognize 
that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of another's 
interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising ... such 
superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and 
judgment as the actor himselfhas."142 
There are a few cases in which the courts have held people with 
superior abilities to a higher standard, but most of these involve pro-
fessionals.143 One of the few exceptions is Fredericks v. Castora/44 in 
which the court held a professional truck driver to the standard of 
an ordinary driver when he caused an accident driving the family 
sedan.145 
What is interesting about tort law in this respect is that a good 
argument can be made that we should not alter the standard of care 
142. Id. § 289. 
143. In an interesting remark in Dillenbeck u. Los Angeles, 446 P.2d 129, 
136 n.10 (Cal. 1968), however, the California Supreme Court reasoned that a 
professional such as an attorney or physician is held to a higher standard of 
care than a lay person because of the professional's greater expertise, rather 
than because the professional holds herself out as such: "Essentially, the 'ex-
pert' cases flow from the proposition that each person in society is ex-pected to 
exercise that degree of care which can reasonably be anticipated from him in 
light of his peculiar attributes, including knowledge, perception, and memory." 
144. 360 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). 
145. I d. at 698. In Johnston u. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 
1983), a federal court noted that a government contractor cannot hide behind 
the so-called "contract specification defense"-which protects a contractor from 
products liability if the contractor follows design specifications-"where the 
manufacturer has special knowledge or expertise." In Cervelli u. Graves, 661 
P.2d 1032, 1037 (Wyo. 1983), the court rejected the reasonable person standard 
in a case involving an accident caused by a professional truck driver, opting in-
stead for an instruction that would permit the jury to consider evidence that the 
driver "was more skillful than others as a result of his experience as a driver." 
In Dillenbeck u. City of Los Angeles, 446 P.2d 129, 136 (Ca. 1968), a police offi-
cer who killed a motorist in the course of a high-speed chase was held to the 
standard of one who possessed superior knowledge and skill by virtue of his "ex-
tensive training and experience." 
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for an enhanced individual when it comes to avoiding accidents. In-
stead, we should hold them merely to the standard of a reasonable, 
unadvantaged person. The reason is that, by doing so, we encourage 
people to improve their vision, which in itself will avoid accidents, 
whereas, ifwe made people with better vision liable under a higher 
standard, thereby discouraging them from enhancing their vision, 
we would lose the benefit in terms of accident avoidance. Whether 
we imposed a higher or normal standard would depend on whether 
we thought that the benefits from reduced accidents on account of 
having drivers with better vision outweighed the costs of accidents 
caused by these drivers when they did not act like someone with im-
d . . 146 prove VISIOn. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this Article is merely a first stab at the question of 
how we may regulate genetic enhancements, several points already 
become clear. The first is that no single method of regulation can 
accomplish the objectives of assuring safety, efficacy, personal 
autonomy and minimizing adverse social consequences. Instead, a 
variety of regulatory mechanisms, public and private, must be 
brought to bear. In particular, it is important to recognize the limi-
tations of specific regulatory mechanisms. Given the motivation of 
self-interest, for example, we should not expect personal or profes-
sional self-regulation to solve the problems of unfairness or cheat-
ing. 
Another relatively obvious point is that banning genetic en-
hancement is unlikely to be completely successful. The allure of en-
hancement will motivate the creation of a black market, or will lead 
people to obtain enhancements in other countries that are beyond 
the reach of our domestic prohibitions. The question then is 
whether the reduction in enhancement that might be achieved by 
strict enforcement of a ban is worth the cost in terms of police activ-
ity and intrusion into private medical and reproductive behavior. 
It follows from the previous point that, in all likelihood, some 
people will become genetically enhanced. The question, then, is how 
society should respond. If the number of enhanced individuals is 
sufficiently small, we may be able to ignore them on the basis that 
their impact in terms of unfairness a11d cheating will be minimal. 
146. A similar analysis might be made of rules that permit a party to a con-
tract to benefit from superior information so long as the result is not too unfair. 
In this case, the argument would be that, by permitting the party with superior 
information to capitalize or,t that information, we give an incentive to create and 
obtain that information. The societal gain in information, it is reasoned, out-
weighs the unfairness to the inferior party to the transaction. See Anthony 
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 n.49 (1978) (noting beneficiary "in effect purchases other 
party's information"). 
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On the other hand, if a substantial minority of individuals is able to 
afford enhancements for themselves or their offspring, the risks to 
society may become too great to disregard. In that case, we will 
need to reduce the costs to society by leveling the playing fields on 
·which enhanced individuals interact with the unadvantaged. 
